PROJECT
OPEN

MUSLIM RADICALIZATION IN SELECTED AREAS OF EUROPE: AFFILIATION PROCESSES AND COUNTERING STRATEGIES

RESEARCH REPORT

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OPEN

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Introduction

The report summarizes the results of the Open Project: Working Package 2. The following text is structured into five chapters. The first introduces the topic by explaining the phenomena of radicalization.

The second is comparing the theoretical analysis (desk analysis) of the partners inside their countries.

The third chapter describes the practical analysis (field analysis). It presents the main aspects and results of the online research activity. Furthermore, it is also interpreting the data in graphics and text. The commonalities and differences inside the partners countries are explained.

The fourth chapter analyses the online survey that was available in five different languages on the projects' website. Not all questions are presented and compared with each other, but the most important are listed in the Chapter. CSOs (Civil Society Organizations) and social workers were able to answer questions that were gathered inside on of the first partner meetings in January. The answers can give us an overview of the circumstances in the partners local area and will be useful for the decision making and possible cooperation's later.

The Fifth Chapter lists a selection of tackle opportunities. That can be helpful and can be integrated into a strategy that prevent the radicalization of young Muslims. For further information and a more detailed plan please note that the document *Recommendation for CSOs* is opening the practical aspects of prevention work.

1 The phenomena of Radicalization

1.1 Definitions of Radicalization

According to reports and policies such as those originating in the European Union and the United Nations, the term radicalization is referred to as a process that leads to extremism and possibly terrorism (Commission of the EU Parliament, 15 March 2015).

Muslim youth can be radicalized in several ways. They may accept radical methods (violence), strive for radical goals (Islamic State) or embody radical characteristics (intolerance, anti-Semitism etc.).[1]

Currently, there is no consensual definition of radicalization. Authors refer to it in different ways. To be in line with the multidisciplinary and multilevel approach, the guidelines draw from at least three complementary definitions of radicalization. Individual and collective

[1] Alava, Séraphin, Frau-Meigs, Divina and Hassan, Ghayda (eds.), Youth and violent extremism on social media: mapping the research (Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2017), p. 10. https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000260382, accessed 03 January 2020.

motivations for radicalization, but also the social and economic situation of young Muslims are taken into account.



Farhad Khosrokhavar (2014) defines the concept of "radicalization" at a micro level, with a focus on the individual person. According to Khosrokhavar, radicalization is a process by which an individual or a group comes to take up a violent form of action. It is linked to an extremist ideology that contests the established order at a political, social or cultural level.[2]

The German sociologist Wilhem Heitmeyer (1989) developed a theory of social disintegration considering the different levels of an individual's ecosystem and their interrelation. This in reference to the socio-psychological arguments of the Frankfurt School whereby violent radicalization is viewed as the product of a combination of individual experiences and social conditions that generate social grievances.[3]

A third definition is used by Schmid (2013) who defines radicalization as an individual or collective process. The term emerges from the friction of intercommunity relations and is associated with a situation of political polarization ("us" against "them"). The practices of dialogue, compromise and tolerance between different players are abandoned, by at least one of the partners, in favour of an escalation of confrontational and violent tactics.[4]

According to the logic of the OPEN project, we especially wanted to take into account the social and economic factors that play a role in possible radicalization. A recent study by the University of Osnabrück shows that this approach is fundamentally correct.

According to research by the Osnabrück Islam expert Michael Kiefer, religion plays a less prominent role in the radicalization of young Muslims than previously assumed. Rather, individual personality, the social environment and often critical life events also contribute to young people joining a radical Islamic ideology, the scientist told the Evangelical Press Service recently: "Radicalization is a complex process."[5]

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[2] Alava, Séraphin, Frau-Meigs, Divina and Hassan, Ghayda (eds.), Youth and violent extremism on social media: mapping the research (Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2017), p. 11.
[3] Alava, Séraphin, Frau-Meigs, Divina and Hassan, Ghayda (eds.), Youth and violent extremism on social media: mapping the research (Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2017), p. 11.
[4] Alava, Séraphin, Frau-Meigs, Divina and Hassan, Ghayda (eds.), Youth and violent extremism on social media: mapping the research (Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2017), p. 11.
[5] Schwager, Martina: Islam-Experte: Religion wird bei Radikalisierung überbewertet, https://www.evangelisch.de/inhalte/170234/18-05-2020/islam-experte-religion-wird-bei-radikalisierung-ueberbewertet, accessed 25.Mai.2020.

1.2 Radicalization strategies and Target audience

In our EMU guideline we have already examined the role of so-called "political Islam" in the radicalization of young Muslims. The following groups are mentioned in public in the context of possible radicalization:

- Salafists
- Muslims from the spectrum of the Muslim Brotherhood
- Hizbu-Tahrir
- Muslims who can be classified as organized, so-called "legalistic" form of political Islam.

We have already indicated that a differentiation is necessary for all the groups mentioned. In all the groups mentioned, Muslims who are ready to use violence are only a small minority. In the field and desk analysis, we wanted to investigate and prove the role of these groups.

<u>Actors who try to radicalize young people mostly offer:</u>



- a simplistic world view and a simple understanding of Islam ("the true religion")
- the return to a root ideology (Islam)
- the disqualification of other religions and opinions ("hate speech")

- the polarization of the social sphere and the construction of a threatened us against them (“friend vs enemy”)
- violence, as a legitimate means for the expansion of root ideologies and related oppositional objectives.

In the desk analysis (chapter two), we will examine the arguments of radical influencers in more detail. Based on a balanced understanding of Islam, it will be possible to expose radical positions and to counter them with counterarguments.

There is a consensus in the sciences that radical social media are primarily used for the following purposes: propaganda, recruitment, logistics and planning and funding.

Especially relevant is here: Facebook, Telegram, Twitter and YouTube.

The internet is used for propaganda websites, various chat rooms, video clips with "scholars," (presenting their idea of Islam and the world) or media reports about specific regions of war. In some cases, an app is also offered to the public, which answers certain legal questions for Muslims.

<u>Basically, the following groups or individuals are particularly susceptible to possible radicalization:</u>



- Young Muslims, who get their world view, their understanding of Islam mainly through Social Media “education”.
- Young Muslims, who are not educated and not connected to an Islamic community.

- Young Muslims who follow a kind of “hyper morality”, often expressed on social media with a simple friend/enemy discrimination.
- Young Muslims who have an idea that Islam is only politics and have lost the idea of a balanced Islam.
- Young Muslims who are confused what kind of (political) engagement is accepted in Europe,
- Young Muslims who feel not at home in Europe and who are the objects of all kinds of identity politics (like nationalism).
- Young Muslims who live under difficult social circumstances

1.3 Radical online content

In addition to the fundamental scepticism in the literature about the crucial role of online media in radicalization, one also must consider the legal situation. All major social media companies are trying to remove radical content. Consequently, it should be noted that many radical voices are now migrating to the Darknet. In the field analysis (third chapter), however, we will show that there are still, albeit occasionally, radical actors in the social media examined.

1.3.1 IT Companies and the European Union: The “Code of Conduct on countering illegal hate speech online”

Since December 2015, a month after the terror attacks in Paris where 130 people were killed, the European Union began with new positions for tech companies, to prevent the spread of violent extremism. After a year Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube agreed to European Union’s hate speech code of conduct. Since than the companies have shorten the time of locating and removing this type of Content.

The European parliament made clear, that terrorist content on the internet should be removed within one hour. Internet companies must react one hour after receiving order from authorities. Even if companies like Facebook or YouTube have no obligation to monitor or filter all content with this decision, the European Parliament made sure that sanctions can be hurtful.[6]

Terrorist content in the understanding of the European Parliament is any material – text, images, sound recordings or videos – that “incites or solicits the commission or contribution to the commission of terrorist offences, provides instructions for the commission of such offences or solicits the participation in activities of a terrorist group.” Further content that

[6] European Parliament, Terrorist content online should be removed within one hour, says EP, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190410IPR37571/terrorist-content-online-should-be-removed-within-one-hour-says-ep accessed 10 February 2020.

provides guidance on how to make and use explosives firearms and other weapons for terrorist purposes.[7]

The expression of polemic or controversial views on sensitive political questions are not considered terrorist content.[8] This should protect the freedom of speech and press.

In 2016 Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube made an agreement with the European Union about hate speech. The "Code of Conduct on countering illegal hate speech online" commits the platforms to review and remove illegal content within 24 hours. Since then companies are removing content faster every year, under criticism from free-speech proponents, who claim that too much content is removed.[9]

The IT companies named above agreed on tackling illegal hate speech online, what is defined in the Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2018 as all conduct publicly "inciting to violence or hatred directed against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic group."[10]

The IT companies and the European Commission are countering the spread as well by strengthen partnerships with CSOs "to fulfil the role of a "trusted reporter" or equivalent, with due respect to the need of maintaining their independence and credibility." The IT companies should make information about partners available on their websites.[11]

1.3.2 Facebook

Facebook reported that they are removing more "hate speech" than ever before on 13th of November 2019. Facebook removed more than seven million instances of hate speech in the third quarter 2019. That is 59% more than the second quarter of the same year. Most of the content (80%) is detected by artificial intelligence automatically, the rest of 20% by humans. Human moderators decide whether posts that users have already reported should be removed.[12]

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[7] European Parliament, Terrorist content online should be removed within one hour, says EP, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190410IPR37571/terrorist-content-online-should-be-removed-within-one-hour-says-ep accessed 10 February 2020.

[8] European Parliament, Terrorist content online should be removed within one hour, says EP, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190410IPR37571/terrorist-content-online-should-be-removed-within-one-hour-says-ep accessed 10 February 2020.

[9] Angwin, Julia; Grassegger, Hannes, Facebook's Secret Censorship Rules Protect White Men From Hate Speech But Not Black Children, https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-hate-speech-censorship-internal-documents-algorithms accessed 15 February 2020.

[10] Commission européenne, CODE DE CONDUITE POUR LA LUTTE CONTRE LES DISCOURS HAINEUX ILLÉGAUX EN LIGNE, https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/eu-code-conduct-countering-illegal-hate-speech-online_fr_ accessed 15 February 2020.

[11] Commission européenne, CODE DE CONDUITE POUR LA LUTTE CONTRE LES DISCOURS HAINEUX ILLÉGAUX EN LIGNE, https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/eu-code-conduct-countering-illegal-hate-speech-online_fr_ accessed 15 February 2020.

[12] Perrigo, Billy, Facebook Says It's Removing More Hate Speech Than Ever Before. But There's a Catch, https://time.com/5739688/facebook-hate-speech-languages/ accessed 16 February 2020.

Facebooks functional hate speech detection algorithms (internally: “classifiers”) is working in 40 languages worldwide.[13] One of the biggest challenges Facebook must face are languages used by minorities. Racial slurs, incitements to violence and targeted abuse can spread in the “third world” more easily than in the US, Europe, and elsewhere. Facebook declined to publish a list of languages in which the hate speech detection algorithms is working.[14]

Hate speech is one of several types of content that Facebook reviews, as well as threats and harassment. Facebook defines hate speech as:

1. An attack, such as it is degrading generalization or slur
2. targeting a “protected category” of people, including one based on sex, race, ethnicity, religious affiliation, national origin, sexual orientation, gender identity, and serious disability or diseases.

Facebook hate speech guidelines were published in June by ProPublica an investigative news organization.[15]

Danielle Citron, an information privacy expert and professor of law at the University of Maryland claimed that even thoughtful and robust definitions of hate speech can yield counterintuitive results when enforced without cultural and historic context: “When you are trying to get as rulish as possible, you can lose the point of it.”[16] Pro Publica is writing that Facebook goal is to apply consistent standards worldwide. Facebooks ruling constitute a legal world of their own.[17]

It was clear that it would be difficult to find online content that can help us to understand the spreading of radical content on the platform of Facebook. Some experts backed up our research with first-hand experience: “Facebook is dead” for people who want to spread radical content in our understanding.

The only opportunity could be to contact one of the censorship responsible persons or Facebook directly to gather some examples regarding our topic. Even if that can be an option to analyse content, it can be said that young people cannot have the same access than our research activity can do.

After reading several articles it was clear that Facebook has a high interest to save information regarding their censorship rule book and the philosophy underpinning the rules. Facebook has a rule against posts that support violence resistance against the occupier. Dave Willner

[13] Perrigo, Billy, Facebook Says It’s Removing More Hate Speech Than Ever Before. But There’s a Catch, https://time.com/5739688/facebook-hate-speech-languages/ accessed 16 February 2020.
[14] Perrigo, Billy, Facebook Says It’s Removing More Hate Speech Than Ever Before. But There’s a Catch, https://time.com/5739688/facebook-hate-speech-languages/ accessed 16 February 2020.
[15] Carlsen, Audrey; Haque, Fahima, What Does Facebook Consider Hate Speech? Take Our Quiz, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/13/technology/facebook-hate-speech-quiz.html accessed 18 February 2020.
[16] Carlsen, Audrey; Haque, Fahima, What Does Facebook Consider Hate Speech? Take Our Quiz, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/13/technology/facebook-hate-speech-quiz.html accessed 18 February 2020.
[17] Angwin, Julia; Grassegger, Hannes, Facebook’s Secret Censorship Rules Protect White Men From Hate Speech But Not Black Children, https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-hate-speech-censorship-internal-documents-algorithms accessed 15 February 2020.

from Facebook said that they "didn't want to be in a position of deciding who is a freedom fighter."[18]

That means that it will be difficult to find information's of radical content made by terror groups inside countries with ongoing interventions by the French Military abroad. In our briefings with the researcher group we discuss that one of the actors in violent content in French language could be found in Syria (ISIS/Daesh) or in other states of the Sahel (ISIS/militant groups against French military interventions in Sahel).

Facebook has developed a definition of terrorism to include non-governmental organizations that spread violence "to achieve a political, religious or ideological aim," regarding a source of Pro Publica.[19]

The head of global policy management at Facebook, Monika Bickert, said that Facebook conducts weekly audits of every single content reviewers work to make sure that rules are followed.[20]

1.3.3 YouTube

YouTube established a machine learning tool to find hateful videos before they can be seen online. Around 80 % of automatic found video material was removed in the third quarter of 2019. Every minute, five hundred hours of video are uploaded in 2018. It remains open how much content of hateful speech YouTube can remove. In 2017, Journalists were pointing out that YouTube became an important stage for terrorist content. Since then, the platform is updating its policy.[21]

In 2018, the company removed 8.3 million videos from October to December. From these videos 6.6 million were flagged by an algorithm. "Hateful or abusive" content make 15% of the total amount, "violent or repulsive" content stands with 13%. The trusted *Flagger* program is also available to government agencies and other institutions. It has a focus on the most egregious forms of abuse, such as child exploitation and violent extremism.[22] Hate speech is described by YouTube as promoting violence against individuals or groups based on following attributes[23]:

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[18] Angwin, Julia; Grassegger, Hannes, Facebook's Secret Censorship Rules Protect White Men From Hate Speech But Not Black Children, https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-hate-speech-censorship-internal-documents-algorithms accessed 15 February 2020.

[19] Angwin, Julia; Grassegger, Hannes, Facebook's Secret Censorship Rules Protect White Men From Hate Speech But Not Black Children, https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-hate-speech-censorship-internal-documents-algorithms accessed 15 February 2020.

[20] Angwin, Julia; Grassegger, Hannes, Facebook's Secret Censorship Rules Protect White Men From Hate Speech But Not Black Children, https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-hate-speech-censorship-internal-documents-algorithms accessed 15 February 2020.

[21] Alexander, Julia, More than 17,000 YouTube channels removed since new hateful content policy implemented. More than 500 million comments deleted, https://www.theverge.com/2019/9/3/20845071/youtube-hateful-content-policies-channels-comments-videos-susan-wojcicki accessed 17 February 2020.

[22] Chacksfield, Marc, The big YouTube crackdown: 8.3 million videos were removed in just three months. YouTube opens up about how it deals with flagged video, https://www.techradar.com/news/the-big-youtube-crackdown-83-million-videos-were-removed-in-just-three-months accessed 17 February 2020.

[23] Google, Hate speech policy, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2801939?hl=en&ref_topic=9282436 accessed 17 February 2020.

- Age
- Caste
- Disability
- Ethnicity
- Gender identity and expression
- Nationality
- Race
- Immigration status
- Religion
- Sex/Gender
- Sexual orientation
- Victims of a major violent event and their kin
- Veteran status

If a user violates the policy, the content is removed, and an email is sent to the owner of the channel. The first Time there are no penalty to the channel, the second time a "strike" is put on the channel. Three "strikes" and the channel will be terminated.[24]

1.3.4 Space of Radicalization: Online, Offline

The new legal situation makes it clear that young people are less likely radicalized via plattforms like Twitter, Facebook, or YouTube. However, problematic groups use these offers under different names and with defused content to make contact.

Today many Muslims take their knowledge from social media, following different scholars or influencers. Instead of a lifelong learning process, some young Muslims get an understanding of Islam in a couple of weeks. Many Muslims today are shocked that radical Muslims have a great shortage of knowledge. The Internet plays here an important role ("Shaykh Google").

The internet is often an important factor, but not the only element which contributes to radicalization. A widespread opinion in the literature questions the crucial influence of the Internet on the radicalization of young people. For this reason, it was important for us, as we emphasize in the question of desk analysis, to also examine the role of online media in the context of radicalization.

There are two main theories on the subject:

The effects-based school perceives the Internet and social media as highly powerful means of communication and propaganda that over-determine other communications tools and processes. Social media platforms are seen as highly effective drivers of propaganda, conspiracy theories and the rise of extremism through de-sensitization, which leads individuals accepting the use of violence.

[24] Google, Hate speech policy, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2801939?hl=en&ref_topic=9282436 accessed 17 February 2020.

The uses-based school sheds doubt on the structuring effects of social media by empirically identifying only direct and limited effects. In this paradigm, the role of social media in violent radicalization and extremism constitutes a reflection of real offline social ruptures.[25]

2 Desk Analysis

2.1 Structure of the comparison

In the following pages we will summarize and compare the results of the extensive desk analysis of our partners from Italy, Germany, France and Spain. The four desk analysis dealt with a total of 18 questions from three points of view:

- the context
- the process of radicalisation,
- responses to the phenomenon and good practice.

The first part was about examining the social, economic and cultural situation of young Muslims in a local and national context. According to the basic approach of the OPEN project, these additional backgrounds are extremely important to understand the process of radicalization. Furthermore, we were interested in whether young Muslims have their own organizational forms and whether they play an active role in existing organizations or local mosque communities. We examined which actors played a role in the social media for young Muslims. Finally, it was also important to examine the self-image of young Muslims and see whether European thinking and the feeling of belonging to one's own society play a role in it.

In the second part, local and national peculiarities of the radicalization process were analyzed. It was important to define those youth groups that are particularly at risk from radicalization. In addition to examining the most important factors for susceptibility to radicalization, the topics that radicals frequently address were also collected. It was also especially important to back up the theoretical dispute about the influence of social media on possible radicalization with practical experience on site.

In the third part, we examined the various government offers and civil society programs for prevention and deradicalization. We were also interested in appreciating the efforts of Muslim organizations and recognizing their prevention work. At the same time, we tried to find an overview of good suggestions for prevention work with young people in the literature of the participating countries.

2.2 The first Part: The context

Basically, the problem in all four countries and regions examined here is that the data is inaccurate. The religious affiliation of the population is not asked for in official statistical

[25] Alava, Séraphin, Frau-Meigs, Divina and Hassan, Ghayda (eds.), Youth and violent extremism on social media: mapping the research (Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2017), p. 167.

surveys. The same applies to the situation of young Muslims in Europe, about whom there is little statistical information. Conclusions can usually only be drawn indirectly from immigration research or from the analysis of unemployment statistics. The fact is, however, that the number of Muslims in Europe is growing steadily and the influence of Muslims on societies will increase. The Pew Research Center estimated 2017 the number of Muslims inside the European Union, plus Norway and Switzerland with 25,770,000.

2.2.1 Figures, population

Despite the aforementioned difficulties in data collection, the following picture emerges in Europe:

The scholar Fabrizio Ciocca 3), relying on data provided by Istat, ISMU and Pew Research Center, estimates that the Muslim population in Italy counts around 4.200.000 individuals.[26]

The majority of Italian Muslims have an immigration background, with the largest ethnic groups being Moroccans and Albanians. Around 1.1 million of the Muslims now have Italian citizenship. Most of Italy's Muslims live in the northern industrial regions and in Rome.

SPAIN:

It is established in the article 16.1[27]of the Spanish Constitution that nobody can be forced to declare about their ideology, religion or other thoughts. In the article 16.2 it is also mentioned that it is forbidden to quantify the number of Muslims based on the origin of a name. Therefore, our Spanish partner was not able to find a report of any time in which it is included the exact number of Muslims in the country. Basically, however, a number of 2.1 million Muslims in Spain is assumed.

FRANCE:

In France, a total of 5,720,000 People are Muslims, what make up 8.8% of the population.[28]

The example of France is also suitable for showing the development of the Muslim population in a n European country. A projected calculation shows that the number of Muslims inside Europe will rise in the future. Even without any migration, the number of Muslims inside France can reach up to 8,600,000 (12,7% of the total population) by the year 2050. In a more realistic scenario with Medium migration (legal migrations, refuges that get excepted, students, etc.) the number can reach 12,630,000 Muslims (17,4% of the total population) in 2050.

[26] F. Ciocca, L´islam italiano, un`indagine tra religione, identitae islamofobia, Meltemi Editore, 2019.
[27] The article 16 of the Spanish Constitution guarantees the ideological, religious and cult freedom, some of the rights most closely linked to the free development of the personality.
[28] Pew Research Center, Europe`s Growing Muslim Population, 2017, p. 4.

GERMANY:

The exact, total number of Muslims in Germany is not known. The statistical research by *"Pew Research Center"* is estimated a total amount of 4,95 Million Muslims in Germany in 2016.1 Of the total amount around 55% or about 2,3 Million are German citizens.[29] After the refugee crisis in 2015, the number of Muslims in Germany should have increased to more than 5.5 million Muslims since 2016.

2.2.2 Umbrella organizations

There are more or less developed Muslim organizational structures in the countries examined here. In all countries it is striking that most organizations still rely on the ethnic immigration background of their members. The cooperation between the organizations is therefore sometimes difficult due to the different backgrounds of the Muslims. Organized Muslims in Europe are mostly represented by various umbrella organizations. In some cases, European countries are also trying to involve the non-organized Muslims more closely.

ITALY:

In Italy there are many small associations but only two large umbrella organizations, which are the Union of Islamic Communities of Italy (UCOII) and the Italian Islamic Religious Community (in Italian COmunità REligiosa ISlamica, COREIS). UCOII includes 163 associations and runs about 80 mosques and 300 unofficial places of worship. On a national level, it is the organisation that has developed a series of activities with greater continuity. Present in almost all Italian regions, UCOII has a largest concentration in northern Italy, particularly in Lombardy, Veneto, Emilia Romagna and Marche. It is constituted mostly from "Muslims of the first hour", of Tunisian, Moroccan and Egyptian origin. Following its formation, the organization has often been criticized for its proximity to influences of the Muslim Brotherhood Association. In recent years however, also as a result of the growing climate of distrust trust following the attacks perpetrated in Europe, the association has stated that the proximity to the Muslim Brotherhood is linked only to a few associates, who do not represent the UCOII as a whole.

The Italian Islamic Religious Community (COREIS) is a national association of Italian Muslims converted, active since the early '90s with the priority of witnessing and protecting the spiritual and intellectual heritage of the Islamic religion in the West. The COREIS is certainly one of the best-known Islamic organizations, not so by the Muslims, but by Italian public institutions, the Catholic Church and indigenous civil society. Therefore, preferring links with the institutional leadership, its line of action can be defined as "legitimacy from above", in contrast to the UCOII's development of "legitimacy from below".

SPAIN:

[29] Pew Research Center, Europe's Growing Muslim Population, 2017.

Some of the most important Muslim organization in Spain are "Comisión Islámica de España" as well as "Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de España (UCIDE)", which is an organization that tries to put together every other Muslim community in the country. Still, there are many other organizations[30] that aim at the same objective.

FRANCE:

French Muslims are represented by several umbrella organizations. They are divided by the origin of their members. There is a high level of interactions between them as an organization and foreign state authorities. The relevant Organizations are the Fédération nationale des musulmans de France (FNMF), Rassemblement des musulmans de France (RMF), Union of Islamic Organisations de France (UOIF)

Grande Mosquée de Paris (GMP) and the Comité de coordination des musulmans turcs de France (CCMTF)

GERMANY:

The majority of German Muslims are not organized in associations. However, especially the larger associations of Muslims with a Turkish immigration background are important and influential players in German civil society in terms of their membership numbers. The Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany (KRM, founded in 2007), coordinates the largest umbrella associations of Muslims (*Zentralrat der Muslime* ZMD, Islamrat, VIKZ and DITIB). Despite various disagreements between the organizations, the Muslims try to formulate their concerns towards the state together with the KRM.

Youth organizations: There are relatively few independent youth organizations at national level. Most youth organizations are integrated into the higher-level organizational structure as departments of the large associations.

ITALY:

There is a good example of an active youth organization in Italy: The main Islamic youth association is that oft the Young Muslims of Italy (Giovani Musulmani d`Italia, GMI) founded in 2001, in response to the 9/11 attacks. The main objective is to create a sense of European belonging, succeeding in harmonizing the religiosity and the identity of their roots, with the Italian life and values in which they were born. Among the founding members we find, among others, Abdallah Kabakebbji and Sumaya Abdel Qader, children of historians UCOII executives. More than a thousand young people formally join the association, but it is followed by many more young people, as witnessed by more than 20,000 followers on the official Facebook page. The last presidents, in chronological order, were Omar Jibril, Abderrahmane Mouhaddab, and the last, elected in 2016, Nadia Bouzekri, the first woman to chair the Young Muslims of Italy. This association was accused and criticized, following

[30] The Observatorio del pluralismo religioso en España offers a tool to find the places of worship in the country. They have a platform in which they collect every entity registered. <http://www.observatorioreligion.es/directorio-lugares-de-culto/index.php>.

statements released by the first leadership of the Young Muslims of Italy. Abdallah Kabakebbji, in fact, in 2016, posted on his Facebook page: "Israel makes no mistakes. Israel is a historical, political mistake, a scam. In case of a mistake that creates damage, you know what you do in my house? Ctrl+Alt+Delete!"

GERMANY:
In Germany, too, most of the larger youth organizations are part of the higher-level umbrella organizations. According to its own information, the German Islam Conference - organized by the Federal Ministry of the Interior - maintains contacts with the following youth organizations of organized Islam[31]:

- Federation of Muslim Youth in Germany (BDMJ)
- IGMG
- Islamic Community Milli Görüş, youth department
- Islamic Community of Shiite communities in Germany (IGS), youth representation
- Islamic Youth in Bavaria (IJB)
- ZMD - Youth association
- Central Council of Moroccans in Germany (ZRMD), youth committee

In FRANCE, the Jeunes Musulmans de France (JMF) is a member of the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organizations. In SPAIN, no activities were spotted by major youth organizations at national level.

2.2.3 Belonging to mosque communities

So far, there have been few social studies in Europe about Muslims' sense of belonging to mosque communities. Basically, only a minority of young Muslims officially belong to the structures of organized Islam and their mosque communities.

The so-called "Young Islam Conference" in GERMANY therefore tries to involve the non-organized Muslims more socially. The “Youth Islam Conference” (JIK) appeals in particular to young Muslims with immigration background, who are not organized in the framework of traditional associations. As a dialogue forum for young people, it addresses questions about a constructive and equal coexistence in an immigration society. Through events and its network, it creates opportunities for encounters, reduces prejudices and wants to empower young people to work for an open and diverse society.[32]

Little is known about the activities of Islamic youth organizations in SPAIN. Young Muslims who practice their faith with different degrees of intensity are mostly in contact with Muslim infrastructure or organizational structures through their parents and their environment. As

[31] Deutsche Islam Konferenz (DIK), Muslimische Jugendorganisationen, http://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/DIK/DE/DIK/2Wohlfahrt/Jugendarbeit/Jugendorganisationen/Jugendorganisationen-node.html, accessed 24 April 2020.
[32] https://www.junge-islam-konferenz.de/, accessed 18 April 2020.

Ndeye Andujar[33] says in “El papel de los jóvenes musulmanes en la transformación del Islam” (The role of Young Muslims in the Islamic transformation), hardly ever do they completely resign of their loyalty to the Islam, and wish to keep the bonds that parents built for them to the religion, although their willing of practicing can be done in a wide variety of ways.

People of Muslim faith and culture in FRANCE have a sense for belonging to a wider Muslim community, while Islam is not playing a big role in their associative participation. Unity can be seen, through the halal food standard, a frequent practice of religion compared to the society and a support of the headscarf in difference to the majority of French citizens. In France, the relationship between young Muslims and Islamic organizations was also examined more closely. An Indicator could be the mosque attendance by Muslims. According to a survey from the Institute Montaigne a total of 1029 Muslims were asked, how often they are going to a mosque. Around 60% responded to have a distant or non-existing relationship with the mosques. Only going for the Ramadan celebration or even not at all. Around 15% of the Muslims usually are going to the Friday prayers. Another 12% indicate to go multiple times a week and 8% say they are going every day to a mosque.[34]

2.2.4 Social situation (unemployment, discrimination)

In general, the social and employment situation of young people is now seen as an important factor in the event of radicalization. An example from ITALY shows this concrete danger:

Considering the profiles of the 125 foreign fighters related to Italy analyzed by ISPI (Institute for International Political Studies), we find that 44.8% of the total was employed in manual labour; 8% had a desk job; 2.4% of them were students and 34.4%, the largest percentage of them, were unemployed. Information on the education of foreign fighters related to Italy are available for 81 individuals of the 125. Of these, 87.7% had a level of education that can be defined as low, while only the remaining 12.3% had a level that can be characterized as medium-high.

SPAIN:
At the same time, the example of Spain shows that more and more Muslims are also striving for a higher degree. According to an essay written by UCIDE and the “Observatorio Andalusí” with data from the 31st December 2018, there are 312,498 Muslim students in Spain, from those 179,357 are immigrants and 133,141 have the Spanish nationality.[35]

In FRANCE, but also in all other countries, the experiences of discrimination of young Muslims in the world of work are repeatedly mentioned. According to a survey by the French survey institute (Ifop) 42% of Muslims living in France reported to have been subjected to at least

[33] Ndeye Andújar is a Spanish techar in Paris, Vicepresident of the *Junta Islámica Catalana* and director of the Islamic portal Webislam. She has an important role in the creation of the contemporary islamic thought, especially in the feminism filȷeld.
[34] Institut Montaigne, Un islam francais est possible, 2016, p. 26.
[35] Demographic study of Muslim population. statistical exploitation of the census of Muslim citizens in Spain referred to as of 12/31/2019. <http://observatorio.hispanomuslim.es/estademograf.pdf.

one form of discrimination (in a control by the police, when looking for a job, when looking for houses) at least one time in their lives.[36]

GERMANY:

In addition, the Federal Government Commissioner for Migration writes in her report 2014:

"Between people with and without a migrant background, there are still significant differences in the income structure, the distribution of working time, the type of employment and the professional status."[37]

As a result, the at-risk-of-poverty rate for people with migrant background (26.8 per cent) is still significant. It is more than twice as high as for persons without this context (12.3 per cent, acc. to Microcensus 2012).[38]

2.2.5 European feeling of belonging

The question of a European identity of young Muslims living in Europe has been widely discussed in recent years. However, many Muslims reject the term "European Islam" because it contradicts their understanding of Islam as a universal religion. However, many young Muslims are committed to the idea of "European Muslims" because they were born in Europe, see themselves as its citizens and understand their faith practice in harmony with European values.

As the following example from ITALY shows: there are quite different positions regarding the self-image of young Muslims. The desk analysis from Italy reports on such a debate: as for the "new generation" at the head of the GMI organization, however, we can understand its orientation towards Europe thanks to a conference held in June 2015, in Crema, entitled "Integration? No thanks! Peaceful coexistence." Obviously, the title of the conference already provoked several reactions. "We know that the title has caused a stir," says Said Hajaouan, of the Crema's GMI´s, "but it´s a very good title. It was a precise choice. For our point of view, rather than integrate, we should live together in a peaceful way. Integration, in some way, involves losing something of oneself: instead, it is right that everybody can take in its territory, its religion, its culture"" Then he goes on to say: "How happens in nature, diversity equals progress. In an environment, biodiversity increases when the quality of life is such that different species can coexist, in our opinion that environment is [the] best."[39]

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[36] IFOP, Etat des lieux des discriminations et des agressions envers les musulmans de france, https://www.ifop.com/publication/etat-des-lieux-des-discriminations-et-des-agressions-envers-les-musulmans-de-france/ , 2019, accessed 10 April 2020, p. 7.

[37] Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration, 10. Bericht der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration über die Lage der Ausländerinnen und Ausländer in Deutschland (Oktober 2014), https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/973812/430396/34552fb4d869bfe17d5fb731b82ca49a/2014-10-29-lagebericht-presse-kurz-data.pdf?download=1, accessed 25 April 2020, p. 19.

[38] Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Handlungsempfehlungen zur Auseinandersetzung mit islamistischen Extremismus und Islamfeindlichkeit, 2015, p.31.

[39] S. Zaninelli, Crema. Il valore della differenza secondo i Giovani musulmani. Sabato il convegno su integrazione e convivenza pacifica, www.cremaonline.it, giugno 2015.

Ultimately, it is always an experience of discrimination that prevent young Muslims from being more strongly identified with European society. All analyses from the 4 countries report numerous experiences of discrimination against young Muslims. Many of them are frustrated that they are perceived by European majority societies as "foreigners" or "immigrants." A passage from the Spanish desk analysis reminds us of this:

According to national and international polls, there is a feeling of rejection towards Muslims and a link with terrorism and Muslim immigration is drawn. Anti-Muslim tendencies have a worrying effect in the discrimination in key areas for inclusion, such as work, education or housing[40]. One thing is for sure, if social inclusion is not happening at a local level, it cannot occur at a European level, in which the main religion attributed is Christianism; forgetting about all the legacies left like during the era of Al Andalus. However, despite the beliefs, Corinne Torrekens, researcher at the Free University of Brussels, pointed out a result of his studies that report: "Muslims who are more religious are not less integrated or politically less active. According to our data, religion does not have an impact on integration."

2.3 The second Part: The process of radicalization

2.3.1. Subject Exposed

In principle, it can be said that there is a similar risk situation in all European countries with regard to the possible radicalization of young people. There are no fundamental differences between the countries. All the following factors of the radicalization process are known in research, regardless of their ideological content:

1. An authoritarian upbringing; especially if there also was an experience of internal violence inside the family.

2. Conflict-laden family relationships, often in connection with parental separation.

3. A fragile personality in adolescence with low social resonance and underdeveloped resilience.

4. Experiences of discrimination that could not be processed. Sometimes, it is not an individual record of discrimination, but a collective one (being a "Muslim") that contributes to radicalization processes.

5. The opportunity to get in touch with scene members, which ultimately random.

ITALY:

Renzo Guolo, professor at Padua University, in his book *Jihadisti d'Italia* (Jihadists of Italy), describes various profiles of people who have become radicalized in Italy, which seem to have in common, in addition to young age, that of being second generation immigrants and alien to national Muslim religious circles and theological doctrines in general. Common characteristics are solitary activation, resulting from the interweaving of personal suffering

[40] El Mundo. (2007). ''El rechazo a los musulmanes en España es una realidad creciente', según estudios de la UE'. El Mundo.

and radicalization, of individuals who are not part of organizations, who have never shown any radical Islamist sympathies.[41]

GERMANY:

In Germany, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution monitors various groups in the radical Muslim milieu. The office divides "radical" Muslims who are prepared to use violence or Muslims who comply with the law but pursue radical goals in the long term. Domestic intelligence reports are published regularly and therefore exert great social pressure on those circles known as extremists.

The example of Germany and Berlin shows that 2019 a growing *Salafist* scene is taking care of young people in a major European city. In recent years, a *Salafist* infrastructure has developed in Berlin, with a wide range of activities. These include mosque associations, lectures by relevant preachers, Islam lessons and seminars, but also the distribution or sale of the Koran or corresponding literature at information stalls. In the internet, *Salafists* offer information in German on numerous websites and social networks. *Salafists'* meeting places are not only mosques in Berlin like the *Al-Nur Mosque*, the as-*Sahaba Mosque* and the *Ibrahim al-Khalil Mosque*, but also organized information stalls under the motto "We love Muhammad." *Salafists* are also recruiting and radicalizing in prisons. There are currently about 40 prisoners in Berlin, where references to *Salafism* or *Islamist* terrorism can be seen. Agitators and their followers prefer to meet in small private, partly conspiratorial circles, in private homes. *Salafist* ideas can there be conveyed "in unfiltered form" in the exclusion from the public.[42]

2.3.2 Online / Offline

The various studies also examined the importance of online media in the process of radicalization. Basically, there are strong opinions that relativize the importance of online influence on the radicalization of adolescents.

Here are two notable individual points from the ITALIAN and SPANISH analyses, which are mentioned here as examples for that thesis.

ITALY:

Three places are considered in the studies the most likely for radicalization, two offline and one online: mosques, prisons and the web. The tightening of controls in recent years has led to concealment in all these places. However, mosques that represent extremist circles of influence are identified. Prisons are considered a typical place of recruitment by extremist movements. Among the problems in this context is the perception of institutional discrimination against Muslims, who are also deprived of some of their religious rights

[41] R. Guolo, Jihadisti d´Italia La radicalizzazione islamista nel nostro paese, Edizioni Angelo Guerini e Associati, 2018.
[42] Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Verfassungsschutzbericht 2018, 2019, p.56.

guaranteed to Christian prisoners, such as the presence of places of worship and access to religious personnel.[43]

SPAIN:

With the information that the INE (National Institute of Statistics) provides, it is possible to visualize the number of young people that use Internet in Spain.[44] Among the 98.2% of young people between 16 and 24 years in Spain used Internet the last quarter of 2019.

According to the study made by "Real Instituto Elcano", the process of radicalization is divided in two parts; people that are radicalized in online channels and people that the process of radicalization takes place in an offline environment. The study of 178 detainees between 2013 and 2016 in Spain was carried out to examine the form of radicalization of the subjects. It talks about the social links between the people radicalized and through which channels they radicalize. The majority of the cases are in a mixed environment; online and offline, with a percentage of 40,3% of the total of the cases reviewed in the study.[45] However, when we separate the online and the offline environment, there are more cases online than offline. People that were radicalized only by internet and social media were a 35.3% than the 24.4% offline.

2.3.3 Radical actors

Potential actors who strive for radicalization of young people in Europe are mostly organized across Europe. The rhetoric of these groups does not differ in Europe, since Islam is understood as a universal world religion. In ITALY, FRANCE and GERMANY in particular, some radical groups are assigned to the *Muslim Brotherhood* or the *Salafist* scene. The various agencies responsible for the protection of the constitution in Germany publish a large amount of information each year on the political assessment of Muslims living in Germany. In Germany, all larger groups from the spectrum of "political-Islam" are active, mostly with connections across Europe. The larger organizations also have partner organizations in other European countries.

The Constitutional Protection Service also officially observing some member organizations of the Coordination Council of Muslims (KRM), in particular the IGMG (*Millî Görüş* – member of the Islam Council) and organizations that can be attributed to the *Muslim Brotherhood* (until recently full members of the ZMD, now their membership is suspended). These organizations, which are clearly non-violent, are assigned by the VS to the so-called "legalist" political Islam.

On the initiative of the VS, the German Federal Ministry of the Interior has also banned some associations from the openly extremist spectrum (e.g. *Hamas*, *Hizbutahrir*). In recent years, the protection of the Constitution has been particularly attentive to

[43] R. Guolo, Sociologia dell`Islam , Editore Mondadori Education, 2016.
[44] Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE): Encuesta sobre Equipamiento y Uso de Teconlogías de la Información. 2019.
[45] Reinares, F., García-Calvo, C., & Vicente, Á. 2017. 'Dos factores que explican la radicalización yihadista en España'. Real Instituto Elcano Royal Institute. 9 aug.

Salafism:

According to the constitutional protection service, puritanical, political and jihadist *Salafists* share the same ideological basis. They differ primarily in the choice of means by which they want to achieve their goal, a "*Salafist* theocracy." Political *Salafists* are trying to spread their ideology through intense propaganda activities – which they call "proselytization" (Da'wa) – and to change society in a long-term process according to *Salafist* norms. In some areas, however, supporters of political Salafism explicitly oppose terrorism, highlight the peaceful character of Islam and avoid open calls for violence.46

2.4 The third Part 3: Conclusions

In the countries examined here, there are now many programs for prevention work. The Islamic organizations involved are increasingly successfully in this. Muslim contacts are often preferred by Muslim young people. Here are some of the programs mentioned:

ITALY:

Several initiatives have been undertaken in collaboration with the Italian Ministry of the Interior, the most significant of which is the drafting of the *Italian Pact for Islam*.[47]

UCOII, for example, in collaboration with the DAP (Department of Prison Administration), has carried out an experimental program of spiritual assistance in prisons. The program took place in eight Italian prisons, those with the highest number of Muslim inmates, and consisted in the access of imams and ministers of religion to these prisons.

The IERS46 and SORAPS47 projects, funded by the European Union, are also part of the school and with a specific focus on religious issues. Both projects provide online content for the training of teachers on the history of religions, as well as materials for the realization of lessons in class both on individual subjects and through thematic paths.[48]

FRANCE:

A training program in the prevention of radicalization for public officials and in particular staff from the Nice Academy was launched in the Alpes-Maritimes prefecture in 2014. A session was held on December 15, 2015 at the Jean Giono college in Nice, in the presence of Michel-Jean Floc'h, inspector of academy (Ia-Dasen) of the Alpes-Maritimes and the sub-prefect of the Alpes-Maritimes Sébastien Humbert. A booklet has been distributed in schools to prevent

[46] Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Verfassungsschutzbericht 2018, 2019, p.194.
[47] la Repubblica, Islam, firmato Patto con associazioni di musulmani. Viminale: "Verso l'intesa", https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2017/02/01/news/viminale_moschee_minniti_islam-157375602, last access 16/03/2020.
[48] https://iers.unive.it/ and https://soraps.unive.it/, last access 16/03/2020.

radicalization and inform teachers on the enrolment process and how to alert and support the students.[49]

Alongside the teachers and educational teams, many actors and partners of the School work with the students of the academy to make them aware of the dangers of the Internet and social networks. The "juvenile delinquency prevention brigade" (BPDJ) of Cagnes-sur-Mer intervened on March 31, 2017 with around sixty students accompanied by the Mission to Combat School Dropout in the Alpes-Maritimes.

Social networks and in general all web 2.0 type services have become established in a few years as "essentials" of the web for young people. But their use is not without danger. Alongside the teachers and educational teams, numerous actors and partners of the School (academic security mobile team, National Police, associations, journalists, etc.) work with students to make them aware of the dangers of the Internet and networks. social.

After an official presentation on February 2018 in Lille, on the 11 April 2019 French Prime Minister initiated an inter-ministerial committee for the prevention of delinquency and radicalization to review the National Plan for the Prevention of Radicalization (PNPR). The Action Plan is involving multiple Ministries and is organized along 5 main lines:

1. Protecting minds from radicalization
2. Complete the detection/prevention mesh
3. Understanding and anticipating the evolution of radicalization
4. Professionalizing local actors and evaluating practices
5. Adjusting disengagement

(official and governmental website on the topic)[50]

SPAIN:

Spain established a strategic national[51] plan to fight against violent radicalization. Its objective is to create an efficient instrument of early detection and neutralization of outbreaks and hearts of violent radicalization, acting on those communities, groups or individuals in situations of risk or vulnerability.

The Ministry of Interior of the Spanish government created in 2010 the PEN-LCRV[52] and it was recently approved. The National Strategic Plan to Combat Violent radicalization want to end up with radical movements in Spain through social awareness and a group work between government and citizens. The objective of the Plan is to "constitute an effective instrument for the early detection and neutralization of outbreaks and focuses of violent radicalism, acting on those collectives or individuals in a situation of risk or vulnerability."

[49] Ministére de l´Education Nationale et de la Jeunesse, Prevenir la radicalisation des jeunes, http://cache.media.education.gouv.fr/file/02_-_fevrier/76/8/Prevenir-la-radicalisation-desjeunes_390768.pdf, accessed 17 April 2020.
[50] Comité interministériel de prévention de la délinquance et de la radicalisation, Le Plan National de Prévention de la Radicalisation (PNPR), https://www.cipdr.gouv.fr/prevenir-la-radicalisation/mise-en-oeuvre-du-pnpr/, accessed 06 April 2020.
[51] CITCO, Secretería Estado Seguridad. 'Plan Estratégico Nacional de Lucha contra la Radicalización Violenta'.
[52] CITCO, Secretería Estado Seguridad. 'Plan Estratégico Nacional de Lucha contra la Radicalización Violenta'.

Cyberspace: The PEN-LCRV assumes the Internet as the free space for information and communications. In this area, the State will focus solely on ensuring that information systems, in general, do not constitute a means for radicalization violent, nor for the training and indoctrination of terrorists and the spread and achievement of its ends. Cybersecurity poses the threat of terrorism by the use of the Internet by groups or terrorist individuals, as an instrument to commit propaganda activities, communication, text dissemination, training, financing, recruitment and obtaining information, all thanks to the growth of social networks, the increase in Internet users in the world and the constant technological advances. All this supposes a necessary technological evolution that, nevertheless, can also become difficult to investigate their activities.

GERMANY:

At the national level, there are numerous prevention programs in Germany. Because of the large presence of Muslims in Berlin, there are also numerous, smaller and larger organizations that look after young people. Under the auspices of the Berlin Police President, the Berlin State Program for Radicalization Prevention is coordinated by the Berlin State Commission against Violence and carried out in cooperation with the State Office for Equal Treatment – Against Discrimination. In this area, there are offers specifically for the education and deradicalization of young people, here among others the following organizations are active[53]:

- Interdisziplinäres Kompetenznetzwerk Deradikalisierung (Denkzeit-Gesellschaft e. V.)

  (Thematic workshops with experts from science and practice)
- Jugendliche vor Radikalisierung schützen (KIgA e. V, social prevention)
- Interreligiöse Workshops und Begegnungstreffen Extrem Demokratisch – Muslimische Jugendarbeit stärken (RAA e.V.)

(Multiplier training for young Muslimas who volunteer youth work in mosques. Workshops for detained and released young people and adolescents from prisons.)

In summary, it can be said that, especially in Germany, enormous funds are used for national and federal prevention work. In all countries there is a tendency to involve Muslim organizations in this work. At the same time, it is striking that there are only a few meaningful studies on the real situation of young Muslims in Europe. It is evident that widespread discrimination experience and the feeling of lack of recognition among Muslim young people makes it more difficult for them to find a stronger European-Muslim identity.

[53] Der Polizeipräsident in Berlin, https://www.berlin.de/polizei/aufgaben/praevention/islamismus-salafismus/artikel.754578.php, accessed 18 April 2020.

3 Field Analysis

3.1 Summary of the Results

All the Partners of the Open project analysed content in their countries that can be understood as radical. In total, the Partners analysed content on the Platforms: YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Telegram.

The scope of this activity is to detect how radicalization took place in social networks. Collecting data is fundamental for the projects implementation as far as it allow to understand how some ideas were spread out in the online field, and what are the main leverage for the diffusion of radical ideas. Each content that was detected, was analysed separately. In the following the gathered Information is presented.

In ITALY and SPAIN, the results were few and the channels had a small number of participants. The Platforms were searched by Keywords, with the goal to find discussions or elements with interactions regarding the topic of radicalization. Considering the scarcity of results, generic pages related to *Salafism* and other groups that are radicalization actors were analysed. The results of radical elements show for both countries the recurrent topic of "global Zionist conspiration." Most of the content is considered to be peaceful and against violence. There was not much evidence of radicalization of young Muslims, born ones and converts. The task show that a radicalization process regarding both countries is not taken place in online platforms with open access. Close groups and chat rooms were not analysed and are not part of the search activity. It can be possible that the radicalization is taken place in face-to-face contacts.

In ITALY 7 Posts out of 2 Channels from Facebook were analysed.

In SPAIN, a total of 15 Statements were chosen and analysed: 2 Posts on Facebook;13 Post from Twitter; 1 Video from YouTube.

A description of the content can be found in the following chapter (3.2).

In FRANCE and GERMANY, the data that has been collected, should be under review and is giving indications on what topics can be considered as radical. Most of the content is peaceful and against violence. In the following the data is described to understand better the *Salafist* movement in both countries. In another step the data is split up into categories to compare the themes and have a better understanding, which are the main themes that are considered as radical by the researchers. In total 6 categories were selected, after the collected data was gathered.

FRANCE:

In total: 24 YouTube Videos were chosen and analysed; 8 contents on Facebook were chosen and analysed; 85 Posts on Twitter were chosen and analysed. In Total 41 Channels were selected,

GERMANY:

2 Instagram posts; 16 Facebook posts; 15 videos on YouTube; 77 posts on Telegram. A total of 32 Channels.

3.2 Radical Online Data in Italy and Spain

The content that was collected in Italian language is drawing a violent picture of democracies regarding their foreign politics in the middle East. The US ("America") is often only seen within the framework of her foreign policies in the Middle East: an aggressor that prevents peace for Muslims in countries of North Africa, the Middle East and Afghanistan.

The critical aspect of the content can be found with wrong facts, in a one-sided presentation. Victims are Muslims, the aggressor is an opposing force: "Zionists", "US-military", "democracies" are an enemy inside a construct that can be described as a global conspiracy theory:

"there is a criminal power, where Satanic Zionist Freemasons are the real protagonists, which has its end: the control of the entire planet, through a new satanic world order with usury and deception and violence There is no doubt that a very violent war against Islam is taking place"

"the birth of an instrument to control the economy of neighbouring peoples and to modify their social structures to their own advantage"

The Italian content can be mainly classified as the same theory. The content was posted from 2 Channels. A secret, worldwide operating power is oppressing Muslims. Inside the content the aggressor is named as "Freemasons", "secret societies", "Zionists", "Jews".

The Spanish content is equally focused on foreign politics. The enemy is the state of Israel, that is oppressing Muslims in Palestine and therefore should be disrespected by Muslims. The country is described as an illegal or illegitimate state:

"IF YOU SUPPORT ISRAEL IN ANY WAY SHAPE OR FORM. I DO NOT RESPECT YOU. PERIOD. END OF CONVERSATION."

The Posts regarding Israel are indicating that nothing good in general can be expected by the country and is closing any room of possible conversation or dialogue by linking it to evil and crimes against innocents (Muslims).

Another Enemy is the US government and its foreign politics in the Middle East:

"We are not against the people of America. Us we oppose the reign of the Arrogance. Today in the top of subversion, arrogance and idolatry is the U.S. Government, though it's actually they manage billionaires and Zionist entrepreneur."

Posts like the above were selected if they underline a conspiracy theory, in which "Zionists" are depicted as the origin of all evil against Muslims.

One Post is indicating the Support for anyone that kills people that are Loyal to Bashar Al Assad:

"May Allah raise and honour those who kill Bashar Loyal and those who support Bashar be It any Arab or subcontinental."

The Syrian civil war is one of the deadliest of the 21st century. Foreign forces and Syrians are fighting each other in various combinations. Post like the one above is not changing anything on the brutality of the war that killed already over 250,000 people.

3.3 Radical Online Data in France and Germany: A Comparison of the Content

The data of both countries were divided into 6 categories. Each can be understood as a topic that is explained in the following subchapters. Each subchapter has a chart, that describes a main believe that can be taken out of the content. It is also useful to overview and classify the data. Because the content can often be understood in different ways, the charts include a selection of quotations for a better comprehensibility of the classification. Each content can be separated by colour, France (blue) and Germany (orange).



The first category "The State and Muslims" describes the relation between state and believers. The authors of the content are interpreting what most Muslims should think about

the democratic system, and how they should act in it. How do they recognize the democratic system and state authorities?

The Second Category “The society and Muslims” is informing about the connection between the Content and the Society. How is the society defined, and how is it seen?

The Category “Salafists and Muslims” is describing the relation between the group members and their understanding of most Muslims living inside France and Germany. It is important to understand how they are separating themselves from the wider Muslim community. What are they expecting from Muslims and how do they see themselves?

The Subchapter “Believers and Non-Believers” formulates the relation between other religions and to the non-Muslim majority inside their country. Its goal is to understand what the struggles for them are living inside their environment. How and why are they separating themselves from other people inside pluralistic societies?

The Category “Harm against Muslims” represents a global perspective, how Muslims must suffer. More content could be collected. The search activity is linked into the partners state and to the target group (people with a high risk of radicalization). Nevertheless the topic is important to understand the radicalization of young People.

The last category “Violent Propaganda” is explained in a separate chapter.. The Content is defined as supportive of violent actions or is violent by itself.

The categorization of the content can be seen inside the table. The table is showing the numbers of content data that was split up into the six categories:

Category	France (No. of content for category)	Germany (No. of content for category)
The state against Muslims	21	20
The society is perverting Muslims	18	8
Salafists and Muslims	46	35
Salafists and Others	23	29
Harm to Muslims all over the World	6	3
Jihadi propaganda	3	19
Total amount of content	117	114

3.3.1 The state against Muslims

The model is describing the data and is summarizing the main aspects of the content found, it is not a complete description, with all the details and aspects that are needed to describe the big picture of political systems. Example are taken out of the sample, France (blue), Germany (orange)



The Content is showing two opposing systems. The first is the present one, a democratic system. Muslims should not participate in elections; it is seen as a creation made by humans and not comparable with the law of God (sharia). The state is defined as an Islamophobic force that is attacking the religion and promoting violence against Muslims in a strategic

manner. The goal is to change Islam to something that non-Muslims prefer the religion to be and therefore change Muslims to their behaviour. The “constantly attack” is often described as an attack against the purity of the religion and its meanings. The democratic system is not something the authors of the posts see themselves as part of. A picture between aggressor (state) and victim (Muslims) is drawn. In conclusion, believers should take Islam (in the *Salafist* understanding) as a protection and opposing force against a brutal and racist state.

The second system (Caliphate) is seen as an alternative to a decadent system (democracy) and the only legit form of state for Muslims to live in. A caliph is removing the disagreements (many different opposing opinions) under the Muslims in a strap of unity.

The content makes clear that Muslims should decide between one of the two systems. Scholars that are promoting different possibilities that allow Muslims to consider a participation in a democratic system are false preachers, corrupted by the non-believers and are acting against the truth.

The content of Germany and France is showing differences concerning two topics.

The online research in Germany analysed two channels that were supporting prisoners who were accused of supporting terrorist Organizations (mainly IS). Both are trying to help prisoners that are charged for supporting a terrorist organization. The help is controversial, the owners are raising funds for family members of prisoners, or court cases, and are asking people to write letters for prisoners. The help of people in need is not something considered as radical, more the uncritical reflection of the authors, why the people are charged of criminal activities. In some of the posts, it was written that they should be freed and have done nothing wrong. An examination of the reasons why the person that are named is in prison makes it clear that they can be a danger to society and it begging the question why they should be freed. Victim and aggressor are changed in the logic of these channels. And what people are considering as justice is changed into injustice.

In France, the Topic of Laicity was discussed on Twitter. It is understood as insurmountable separation between a believer and his religious freedom. The education inside the French school system is described as danger for children because they are not educated in religious sciences. The promoting of education that is seen as not comparable with Islam is addressed and described as an attempt of the state to convert Muslims to non-Muslims. The content regarding the relation between Salafists and state that was collected shows a generalized picture of good and bad. The believer must decide between both of them, while the interpretation of what is considered as such was already drawn. It is argued that the participation inside democratic systems is forbidden; It is difficult for young Muslims to express there needs and find their role and identity inside their home country. [the following screenshot is describing the separation between two opposing Worlds.]



3.3.2 The Society and Muslims

The content is giving the indication that the society is a bad influence for believers. It is not something the authors of the content think that they are part of, or Muslims should be. Western lifestyle is often addressed with the Music, that is considered as drug which detracts



people in their believe in God. The relation between men and women is another topic seen as problematic.

The content shows that society is seen as all the people who are not living after the religious rules of Islam. The "pure" Muslim Youth are in the eyes of the authors at a high risk of being drawn into actions which are prohibited. The stigmatic term society is showing everything what is not allowed. The negative on the one hand is controversial to a missing positive picture but can be assumed as a society dominated by Muslims, living under *Sharia* law.

Muslims have do decide between two opposing pictures. In the impression of the researchers, there was often no other possibility than good and bad. And the opposing bad can be understood as an undiscovered unknown with not much connection to the authors of the Posts.

To understand better the meaning of what the "Western Lifestyle" is or habits of "Western society" are, the definition of the word must be under review. Most of the posts that where collected, showed that they can be separated into two, main topics. Firstly, the relation between man and women and secondly, Music. Some of the postings were standing alone and had critical viewpoints on a society promoting individualist and materialist behaviour. Others are not shown inside the model reasons of space. Here were similar statements in terms of the presented content.

Women are often something that had to be protected from bad influences. Decadent dress is decried as a danger. Visible, attractive female figures could therefore lead to adultery and destruction of families. The only way for women and man to be together is in marriage. And there is no room and no places where they may meet. A strict separation of both sexes is important for believers but in his strictness a outstanding Scale inside the believe system of Salafism and is opening up questions regarding, school, universities, work, and public places were a separation is not given, wanted and seen, in France and in Germany. The example (in the orange box, left side) shows a post of a Telegram group. The scholar/owner of the group is asked if women and men can study inside the same university (like this is the case in all the Universities inside Germany). His statement was summarized and therefore not shown as a screenshot. He underlines the importance of learning for Muslims. Nevertheless, the content shows women should not be studying inside the same university.

> A Brother asked me, if it is forbidden to study in a university where male and female are studying together… I think we need sisters that study as well, but I think that they are more week and will more easily decayed the temptations than the brothers… The Kuffars are specially targeting them, to influence them on a western lifestyle, the danger is bigger here… They are more isolated and are not used to contact to Kuffar, that is why it is more dangerous for them, they should study in online courses.

They are in danger to be influenced by Western lifestyle. The Post is also shown that there should be a separation between believers and non-believers. The topic of music was chosen to show the difficulty believers must face inside a society. It is not a viewpoint critical music or its industry. Music itself is seen as a distraction, and a perversion that lead to worsened habits and crimes. The process by which music leads to crime, rape, violence against women, drugs (like Cocaine [shown in one example]), is an overreaction, and a dangerous connection, after such believe a indicator for dangerous actions, can be seen in every smartphone, subway station, car, or shopping mall.



3.3.3 Salafists and Muslims

The model describes the relationship between *Salafists* and Muslims. The members of the Channels are seeing themselves as preachers that must worn Muslims about different things that are in their understanding not right. The goal is to lead the majority of the Muslim community away from other actors as far as possible. In Conclusion a clear line can be drawn, between "us" seen as good (in the *Salafists* understanding of Islam) and "them" (seen as bad). The actor Non-Believers is represented with his habits inside the society. The *Muslim Brotherhood* are seen as modern Innovators because of their participation in elections. The same goes for *Salafist* preachers that are considered moderates. Cults, are seen most of the time in members of Sufism. In their belief they are changing Islam to a perversion of itself. And Shia, a separation between Sunni and Shia is considered as quite common but mentioned because of the aggressive Content found in this regard.

The Picture above was split up into 4 parts that are presented in the (next four pages; NAME PAGES: 1 to 4), to show a selection of Content that was found.

The first part (upper left) describes how members of the postings seeing themselves. As a unique group of Muslims that want to go back to the basics of Islam – without any addition or reduction. The bigger part of the Muslim Community is supposed to follow them on the path of truth and therefore have to be reminded what it is and what the innovations are. This begs the question: who decide what an innovation is? The authors of the posting as well the *Salafi* movement itself are divided into many groups which are often separated after the interpretation of what is allowed (i.e. Quran and Sunnah) and what is forbidden (i.e. was innovated). One characteristic is hyper morality that can be seen in many postings and is separating the authors from "most Muslims."

The second part (upper right) shows examples of expectations, the authors of the posting have towards other Muslims. Some show obvious exterior expectations, as clothing or haircuts of women that must be different to those of a non-believer. The wearing of a niqab, that covers up the face of a women often is expected. Other expectations are thematizing the apostasy of Muslims, that should and have to be separated from the disbelievers. The goal is to convince other Muslims to follow rules and interpretations that are not established inside the Muslim community and are not seen as obligations.

The third part (bottom left) gives an indication of the diversity of the *Salafi* Movement. *Salafist* preachers that are giving indications of statements which are opening space for engagement between Muslims and Non-Muslims, or between Muslims inside a democratic system, are described as moderate and a distraction for the "real Muslims."

Imams who are perceived as too close to the state, the system, or their values, supposedly lose their values for the Muslims. Some postings can be understood as warnings against Muslims that have patriotic feelings to their nation or trying to build bridges between people of different faith. The audience is supposed to rethink the attachment to people who are showing indications of "separation" form the believes of the authors. A single decision can turn one from a Muslim into a "Innovator" of the Religion. This is seen as a danger for all other Muslims that follow the pure path and always are in danger of a distraction, that moves them away from the right path.

Two kinds of preachers are thus defined: one is strictly separating the Muslims from the rest of society, with the intention to secure the unchanged behaviours, that are extracted from past interpretations. Sometimes also taken out of Interpretations by scholars which are important figures in the *Salafi* Movement like Ibn Taimiya (1263-1328) or Ibn-Qaiyim (1292-1359).

The other (described in the Quotations below) is perverting the true message. Preachers who are doing this become enemies of Islam. Terms like "ignorant", "separative", "lost", "cultic" "moderated" or "soft" are often used adjectives to describe that no one should "trap" to become likeable to other, available positions. This is also stopping any debate on the subject immediately by defining the opposing standpoint as a danger to one's own believe.

The fourth part (bottom right) is showing content that represents the attitude regarding *Sufism*. One of the outstanding traits of this group is to declare Muslims to Non-Muslims. The high level of judgment can be seen regarding people that are Muslims but not in the understanding of the authors who declare themselves judges of different forms of believe:

similar to the “moderated preachers” *Sufism* is destroying Islam. The difference between both is that – while “moderate Preachers” are seen mostly as misguided Muslims – Sufis are excluded from the Muslim community. It shows the intolerance of the group regarding other interpretations.

1/4

"The reason is that there is a lot of innovation committed by Muslims even those who follow a madhab. That's why **we want to go back to the basics**"

Polytheists ??? Fear Allah akhy. We only follow the Koran and the Sunnah according to the understanding of salaf salih, which way is better than this? **We call Tawhid and we disown all forms of shirk**. Allah y hdina

Salafists

"...authentic Islam unlike, the sects which brought back innovations etc. the salafis them **fight the shirk and the innovations, Islam without addition or reduction**

"... a hand full of people that are right, while a **big part of the Muslim community is wrong**"

And if they call for you during your trip, don't turn to theirs, because every time you respond to them, **they ill take you and turn you in a different direction**."

The more you cling to the Sunnah, the stranger you become to the people!

"The Muslim community is divided into different groups. Only **one will go to heaven, all other will go to hell**"

"What can be sad, of **a self-called Muslim** that can't get up to the morning prayer? His heart is full of Negligence and Hypocrisy. This Servants think that they are strong and good Muslims, but they are not sure how far they are away from the straight way and from the right thinks that **a true Muslim** should have."



"Qur'an is better than Music. Sunnah is better than Tradition. Prayer is better than sleep. Silence is better than sleep. Silence is better than bad words. **And whoever does all these good works are better than all**."

Majority of Muslims in Europe

Among the causes of the division of Muslim (picture: One of the causes of the division of Muslims, innovation and ignorance)

2/4



After the tombs inside the mosques, the innovations and the songs/music inside the mosques, the mosques of homosexuals,... **The ban on wearing the full niqab inside a mosque in Cannes**

The description explains how to see if a Muslim leaves the right path with the Muslim Communities. Different steps that will led him to apostasy. The fictive character of the story is accused with believes, actions, and behavior's, that can be an indicator of believers to see how he leaves Islam and can react to it.

"May Allah facilitate the brothers to **remove their profile picture and preserve our sister from this Fitna**. And may he strengthen us on the truth ..." [online profile pictures]

The four Imams have one opinion, **that a women should cover up her face**, mandatory, Those who have another opinion are people from the Shafii law school and not Imam Al Shafii himself- Shaykh Sulayman al-Alwan

„How can it be that the Kuffar are covering up their face because of the Virus and you are not cover it for Allah the lord of the Worlds."

"Only 2 people know the value of hijab: a woman with honor and a man with jealously. (A picture of women wearing a full body (face covered Hijab)"

"which lets the shirk recover -**the one who allies with the disbelievers against the Muslims**."

Society in FR/DE

"Question: **Can a women learn the Quran with a Shaykh**? Answer: Yes, if she can't find a female teacher and if she can find one, but the teacher is on the same level than the student. The restrictions are**, 1 they are not allowed to be on the same room alone** (no phone call, or via Internet), **2 no other topic than the Quran can be spoken of**, 3 if the male teacher is sure that a female teacher cant be found, 4 if a f. Teacher is found he has to immediately stop the curse, 5 the women is not allowed to change her voice to make it sound nicer (to impress him)"

The Poster explains, which **action let a Muslim to leave Islam**. And become a Renegade to Islam (murtad). 10 Actions are listed

Many say they are not ready for marriage but are ready to live in fornication as if they were married; wander, eat, quarrel, give each other gifts and have intimate relationships, wal 'iyadou billah! May Allah grant sinners sincere repentance.

Muslim women must be **educated** according to Islamic values from childhood so that they can grow up in a **pure environment**, **sheltered from everything that religion does not tolerate** (a picture shows **two women (faces covert**) a text besides: there is no better clothing than the clothing of modesty and chastity)

Question: What is the Judgment for women to **cut their hair?** Answer: It is allowed for women to cut her hair... if it is not similar to a men cut .. or **similar to the women that are disbelievers and wicked**... a married women is not allowed to do so, without the permission of her husband.

3/4



Link of a post of a known Salafist in Germany, that inform about the Prime minister of new Zealand, that was standing up against Islamophobia that has no room everywhere. The Comment: Marcel (name of the Salafist that posts the story) tries to put the picture of the Kuffar into a good light. No one of his followers should hate the Kuffar... but we hate them, we hate them bevor they kill us.

"... instead of calling on Muslims in your mosques to go to vote and participate in an unjust and idolatrous system, call on Muslims to follow the Sunnah and non- Muslims to enter Islam"

They are just perverted, miscreants, "if could just choke them with a pillow" " I hate them"

BBC News message, that describes the statement of a Muslim that lost his wife on the Christchurch Terror Attack. He says that he is forgiven the murder, even if he cannot support what the killer did. A known Salafi Imam comment: That is strong. May Allah give him patience. The Owner of the Telegram Channel is Commenting: **The Wife of him was shot by the Enemy of Islam and he says that he still don't hate him... What a Loser....**

"Does the one who call for absolute liberty, without any restrictions, oppose himself openly to the setting of Sharia? It is compulsory for the governors to sue and punished those kind of people toward the exigences of Sharia 5..." **This person should be judged and if he doesn't come back to Islam and keep away his evilness, then he is executed"**

An "imam" of the republic who: -reject the advice in the light of the Koran and the Sunnah, - singing the Marseillaise, - encourage to congratulate the disbelievers during their celebrations, - call for secularism, -and rejects one of the main principles of the faith "al-wala wa al-bara"!

The Content is focusing on a petition to establish a federal Commissioner for the protection of Muslims. (After a terror attack in Hanau, Germany)... "**If you sign a petition like that, a law is made because of you. That is democracy and that is shirk (polytheism)... stop signing such dirt**."

moderated Salafists lie to real Muslims

Warning against some preachers like Rachid Eljay, Nader Abou Anas (which are seen as popular and moderated) The misdeeds of democracy, like the fact that voting is not compatible with Islam

4/4



It is a list of different scholars of Islam that are giving quotes about Sufism. It shows that forms that are not seeing as accepted are seen as cults and not part of the Muslim community that is defined by the author.

a list of groups considered as cults and non real Islamic groups like soufis, haddadias, tablighs,

There are around 70 Cults/Sects in each Religion; Christianity, Jewism, and Islam, only one group is seen as legit that is the one of Quran and Sunnah (Salafi movement). The Topic of the Video: "Are there Sects in Islam"?

The perversion of the Shias. Khomeini: "A man can have sexual pleasure with a child in then age of a baby"

SOUFI / TASAWWUF, A Sufi says openly: WE ARE TOMB WORSHIPERS! A ع oudhou bi Llah! My dear brothers and sisters, watch out for your TL, sectarians are trying to make propaganda. If you see: Sufi, or Tasawwuf or Tawassul ... BLOCK THEM

Shias are not our brothers, they are Satan's brothers

Mashaa Allah? Either you are ignorant of what you are doing, or in bad intention. It is not about "sport" more about ritual/mystical/esoteric/occult/dance! May Allah guide them and take us away from their deviance

Ritual Soufi (esoteric, occult and mystical) Ibn Rajab: "anyone who brings something new and integrates it into religion without finding a religious foundation for it falls into aberration and has nothing to do with religion" [Jami Al-Ouloum wa-Hikam] (picture of Sufis)

Are "ennemis of salafiya". cults (tablighs, irwanis, quobt, haddad, etc)

3.3.4 Believers and Non-Believers



The graphic is summarizing the Information that was gathered through the posts on social media. The difference between the platform selection, Germany (Telegram), France (Twitter), can be seen in the content. Telegram is not as strict with deleting radical content than Twitter.

Content is ordered in five different steps Step 1 is separating 2 opposing groups from each other – Muslims and Kafirs (Disbeliever),

Step 2 is giving information regarding Muslims who are – in the perspective of the authors of the posting … interacting unproperly with Kaffirs (Disbelievers) and therefore break up a strict separation.

Step 3 is giving examples of the existing relation between believers and Non-believers.

Step 4 describes the single way of interaction that is seen as legit. There is only one kind that can be excepted.

Step 5 presents postings that indicate fears of their authors that "Kaffirs" want to convert them into non-believers.

The Graphic is separated into 2 Parts for a better overview of the content.

The first part separates people into believers and non-believers. The latter is always defined with positive characteristics; a non-Believer with bad ones. The believer is following the truth and therefore separates himself from its counterpart. The truth is what the Quran and Sunnah are describing. Therefore, someone who is not following this path, inside the Quran or Sunnah, is on another path. It's a clear cut between right and wrong. There are strict lines. The content is showing a definitive understanding of people. There are no ambivalences or further possibilities by which people could be recognized. But who is deciding? The leading scholar can separate people: enemy, friend and misguided. Postings often show missing connections to people that are not Muslim. And the danger of an unknown opposing force, that wants to destroy their believes and religion. Separation is strict and does leave hardly any room for interactions between people and arguments.

The second part of the Graphic is quoting examples of the content, that is strengthening the separation between believer and non-believer. The only way of interaction is the invitation to the Kaffir to become Muslim. On the other side, the Kaffir is seen as somebody who wants to convert Muslims to his believe system. Coexistence of both is often dominated by the idea that the opposing side wants to integrate the other by controlling its actions and believes, and therefore destroys the opposing believe structure.

The channels warn others to be careful of not becoming corrupted by disbelievers, so that the religion is protected by outside influences. While the Kaffirs (Disbelievers) are accused to be intolerant, by willing to change everything the Religion should be, the authors are equally intolerant of other religions, leaving them the option of conversion or separation. It goes back to the believe that if they do not invite them to Islam, the other (Kaffir) is going to hell. So, the only way for him to be saved is his conversion. The other religion is often seen as a misguided, a false one. People should not discuss, what can lead to subspecies beliefs about the unknown opposite group. It shows a disconnection inside a society, that makes it difficult to work together and master challenges, even just for some time. It is a picture of "us" versus "them." Some posting indicate a sign of discrimination or bad experience with people that belong to society's' majority.

The debate is dominated by the generalization of people into concepts. Often, quotations are used from past scholars. Quoting out of context is one of the issues found out by the researchers in many analysed postings. A viewer that is scrolling from one to another, is not understanding any of the deeper meaning of knowledge, that grounds the quotation. When

was the source living? What were the circumstances of his times? What was the context of the quote? It is taken out of context and perspective; then thrown into the present. The viewer tries to find meaning inside the current time; without understanding the deeper historical perspective of it. It is important to describe historical context, descriptions, and perspectives.

Part 1/2

Part 2/2

The Separation into

"The separating Characteristic

"Look at the elderly, they all have what we call "old man habits". But observe **the old Muslims and the old disbelievers you will see the difference** one who has halal habits and the other Haram habits"

"In our time, Muwahhid has no friends. He has brothers and sisters as allies (awliya) and all the rest are only his enemies."

"The Jihad against the Nafs (Ego)- Ibnul Qayyim said: Jihad is the fundament for the Jihad against the hypocrites and disbelievers"

"...[They say that we are radicalized] It is not the tortures of our enemies that will make us back down. Allah has promised Paradise to the Martyrs as a destination"

"And this human is on his way to hell when he dies like this. We have to internalize that Islam is perfect. Islam is absolute perfect. When the other person is not accepting Islam, it is not your fault, it is the fault of the other person. The heart of the other person is the problem. We want for him love the best: Islam. On the other side, we are not taking one step back from our message. **Islam is the truth, everything that contradicts Islam is wrong**. **The way of hell.** "

[Christchurch]... it is strange to see that some (Muslims) want to get closer to the Kuffar, and exchange the good they have against the dirt what they (Kuffar) can over to them... That is what they want to establish in the heads of the Muslims... May Allah better our situation

"... We ask Allah for victory... To help his supporters and humble his enemies... What the occupying Jews and the transgressing Christians in Power have let it fall down in heaven, and destroy it on earth, let it sink in the Ocean..."

"Question for all Haters. Is the world Islamic? Answer from everyone with mind: No, the world is not Islamic. And that is exactly the proportions the world against the Mujahidin."

"Don't argue! "There is no greater crime committed against Muslims than that of debating with innovators."

3

"the **disbelievers are not our friends, ... they are not our allies, they are enemies of Allah**... even if they are interested in Islam. **There's no time spending time with these persons, except for da'wah"** (my buddy, my friend, my brother. these are not permitted dating"

Link of a post of a known Salafist in Germany, that inform about the Prime minister of new Zealand, that was standing up against Islamophobia that has no room everywhere. The Comment: Marcel (name of the Salafist that posts the story) tries to put the picture of the Kuffar into a good light. No one of his followers should hate the Kuffar**... but we hate them, we hate them bevor they kill us.**

The Kafirouns they would like us to get lost and follow them... then they try to make us believe that we Muslim force them to embrace Islam except that **we by our Dawa we want the good while they desire evil.**

The Kouffars (Disbelievers) say: "you do what you want at home", but this is not true, because even with us, in Muslim countries, **they want to prevent believers from living their Islam freely**. **Freedom for the Kouffars is only if you agree to them"**

4

One way of Negotiation, through Conversion

5

3.3.5 Harm against Muslims

The audience should be addressed to not passively watch the harm suffered by Muslims from all over the World. In the postings, the "West" or Western democracies are seen connected to crimes against Muslims by supporting states who are harming innocent Muslims. The religious connection between believers inside Islam is often addressed; as well as the Muslim community that is not actively doing something against these crimes.



"Shaykh Sulaymaan al Alwaan, the crying over the massacres without doing anything is a lie. It is not of use for the Ummah"

"Crazy World… and in this world asleep Ummah (Muslim Community) that forget about the life after dead and is preferring worldly and not to see. May Allah forgive us and put us on the right path."

The embedded video is showing two man in military uniforms, shooting at a man lying on the ground. Before, the is moving. When the shots are over, he is not moving anymore.
It hints that Israel requested Egypt to empty the Sinai of his inhabitants and is describing a connection between the action and the French state.



All four pictures show areas in the World where Muslims are under attack and must suffer.



This posting describes the harm against Muslims in India. It hints to a connection between the crimes, that are the start of a Genocide committed by a democracy that is connected to the French President, Emmanuel Macron. The message is saying that Macron is in favor of the crimes his "brother" Modi has committed.

3.4 Violent Propaganda

3.4.1 Overview of the Content

The content in this chapter must be reviewed separately. While all other channels were distancing themselves from violence and try to separate themselves and the *Salafi* movement from terroristic actions. This is not the case regarding three Telegram channels which have been collected for further review. All the content was collected through three channels, from Telegram, and in German.

Another two German one were seen critical but not clearly in favour of violence. Both are trying to help prisoners who are charged for support of a terror organization. The help is controversial. Its organisers are raising funds for family members or court cases. They are asking people to write letters for prisoners. The help is not something considered as radical, more the uncritical reflection of the authors, why the people are charged of criminal activities. In some postings state that they should be freed. An examination of the reasons why the person is in prison makes it clear that they can be a danger for the society. Thus, it is opening the question why they should be released. Victim and aggressor are changed in the logic of the channels. And what people are considering as justice is injustice for them. It shows that some content is critical but difficult to classify.

The first channel can be understood as a support for global jihad. Often bringing the viewer into a scenario in which he should decide if he wants to become a hero by fighting for the interest of God, for the suffering Muslim community in the Arab world, or be a powerless observer of injustice Muslims have to suffer from. Regarding the content that was watched, there are indications of a male living in Germany who has links to a *Salafi* understanding of Islam.

The second one is run by a user who is part of a German speaking terror group operating out of Idlib, Syria. The content is defining Assad as the main enemy of the group and many postings are showing combat experience as fighters against the Syrian army. The group is fundraising money, while addressing implicit people from Germany to support them so they can buy equipment and weapons. The scenes that are shown in videos on the channels' site are brutal; the dead of an opposing fighter is seen as a victorious act. In other videos, it was made clear that the dead of an enemy is worthless; and the opposing powers (America, Syrian army) are dehumanized at many occasions.

The third channel shows propaganda Material from terrorist organizations like IS, and fighting songs are uploaded inside the Telegram group. The scope is limited, but in his meaning and message clear.

Most of the content was posted in the year 2020.

All three channels have a link to ISIS *Daesh and are supporting the activities with propaganda material. The first Channel is based in Germany and can be understood as support for ISIS and global Jihad. The danger here is the stereotyping of an enemy that is basically an attacker of Muslims. He is forcing people to believe that they should be heroes by joining worldwide Jihad against injustice in the Muslim world. The channel is showing a wide spectrum of content, so

it is hiding sometimes his support of violence by speaking of daily life in a society seen as weak and passive, regarding the support of the real problems in the Muslim world. The creation of a situation that people should choose between hero or loser can be seen in many postings.

The second Channel is a terror group fighting right now in Idlib. The picture that they present speaks often of brothers and siblings that are fighting a demonized enemy. With the word brother they create a connection to the viewer, who is pushed into a belief that they are fighting, killing and dying for him, while he is just watching. It draws someone inside from passive to active. The violence in the video is shocking and together with the direct integration of the viewer by the words they use; it lets people become close to them.

The third channel is the second one with a clear link to global Jihad. War and fighters are presented as a normal and honourable way of support for oppressed Muslims.

3.4.2 The Supporter

This channel creates a picture giving its viewer a choice between being a "caring" hero defending the Interest of God and the Muslims in the world; or a "passive" Looser that is not "religious enough" to fight for the Interest of Muslims in the world by joining the armed struggle like members of the terrorist organization IS (Daesh) have done in the past.

The viewer is forced to decide. Which character is one seeing as itself? While the answer can be taken out of the prescription of two opposing groups. In some cases, the viewer is also confronted with situations in which no one in the world is caring and fighting for Muslims (victimized): "Don't be naïve and think that people will give you what you should want. What we want they can't give us. So, we have to fight for us by our own."



3.4.3 Jihadist Propaganda inside Syria

In total, two channels were found that show violent material from battlefields around Idlib, Syria. Most of the content are Videos, with a short description to them. There are also text captions like a description of the armed form of Jihad:

"Jihad is a substance of healing for the Individuum and the society. It is healing the Individuum, by leading him from the Illness of disbelieve to the well-being of Islam. The unbelieve towards Allah is the biggest sickness of all and the most destroying one for the entire humankind, while Islam is the entire healing. Jihad heals the society, by removing the origin of corruption and oppression. To not impress the disbelievers can lead to a bigger sickness and will strengthen them and allows the cancer to spread… so Muslims can live in peace… if the peaceful ways are not leading to success. the people of truth must fight with their sword to establish Allah's words. – Kitabul Jihad from Nuhas."

After sifting through all of the content, some examples were taken out to provide an overview of how violent war propaganda could attract young people. While most of the materials were videos, a small caption of the videos is made to describe the main information inside it.

The Content is showing a Picture of a man, around 30 years old, smiling inside a camera (selfie), Text under the Picture:

"Ayman Abdul Wahid, a Syrian, has reportedly died in Düsseldorf, Germany as a result of the coronavirus. He left behind a wife and 2 little girls. This is not the first case of a Syrian dying abroad as a result of the virus, others have died in places including Spain and Italy. Syrians that left the land of Jihad, but died somewhere else, you cannot run away from death. May Allah forgive him and be merciful with him."

The author is indicating that the dead of the men is linked to his escape out of Syria to Germany. Indirectly he is saying that it was his mistake to leave Syria, to not join the fight and die as a coward. Muslims that run away from the holy war are dying anyway. With the exception that they need God to forgive them for their cowardice. Men that are not participating in the fight of the group, are doing something wrong.

The content is showing a video: a men is stepping on a copy of the Koran; and disrespects Islam. The caption under the Video:

"A kafir (disbeliever) Buddhist is stepping on the Quran and is unhonourable. He will later be punished by two siblings that catch him in his room. A message on all those who offend our Religion, Jihad will be the Result. Jihad… that is the language the kuffar will understand."

The generalization that is used is showing that the authors do not leave any other room for interaction for someone that disrespects the religion other than violence. The word Jihad can

have different meanings, regarding the situation it can be said that the answer of disrespecting the religion is war against the disbelievers in the eyes of the author. The only language the disbelievers would understand is shutting down other opportunities of interaction between a believer and disbeliever in a described situation. The border of what can be tolerated has been changed.

Video: A German News site (TV) is speaking inside the video about members of a terror-organization, active in Syria. Their members and activities. Text: "They are reporting about us, my name is not Phillipe and that is also not the photo of the Face. You can still fond money on new addresses, we changed our Bitcoin addresses, to rise the security of our brothers." Contact to Bot.

The author is aware of the different interpretations of his actions. He pokes fun of the report, by challenging the truth of the Information shown about him. He wants to show his domination: I am ahead of you. He is addressing a support group (possibly from Germany) that is supporting the activity of the group financially (via Bitcoin): You don't have to be afraid that the state authorities would catch you for supporting me. They are not clever enough to even know who I am.

In Total 6 Videos were chosen that are linked to violent propaganda online and are filmed outside of Syria.

Caption: A brother, who call the regime to take away their dead, because they stink. Video: Shows two man, speaking to the camera. A message to the Assad regime. Taunting the dead man lying behind them. Dehumanising them.

Text: "Siblings during a surprise attack". Video is showing armed man entering a room, shooting at a man lying on a bed. Surprised by the attack, the man goes down after being hit by shots fired at him.

Video: It ss showing an armed (vehicle) shooting into the dark. Text: "Who ones stand beside it, knows that this can't be described (heart eyes emoji)."

Talk by a spokesman of a terror organization. Video is recruitment propaganda for an armed war, in the interest of God.

Text: And at this day, the Islamic Flag is the banner, the splendour of our Religion. (Video is shown; that is indirectly supporting the Islamic State)

Men are shown in the video. Heads are covered. Video is heroic and shot from different camera perspectives. Like a video game a drone is also used. Weapons are seen and military exercises are shown in the desert.

4 Evaluation of the Questionnaire

4.1 In General: About the Participants

This subchapter offers an overview of the background of each Participant and their organization. (4.1.1) is describing the number of answered surveys, (4.1.2) gives a small description of the background of the organization, (4.1.3) describes on what social media platform the participant is active. Especially for later interaction inside the online campaign, this is a crucial Information.

4.1.1 Total number of questionnaires answered

The surveys were answered between the 04.03 and 21.05.2020. The results should help with decision making: What are our recommendations of tackling the phenomenon of radicalization?

The Online Survey was answered by 113 Organizations and Social Workers, that were selected after one of the following Criterion: working together …

A) with young people in the age of our target group (youth clubs, organizations that have experience with our target group)

B) with young Muslims in particular (Muslim Organizations, and their youth sections)

All the selections must be

C) active in the partners local area

The survey was available online in five languages (Spanish, Italian, German, French, English). The chosen language can provide an overview of the origin of the participant that answered the survey. The survey also asked about the name of the organization, but the answer especially regarding a sensible topic that is analysed inside the OPEN project should not be a prerequisite.

The total (113) answered surveys can be split up by nations:



4.1.2 Type of Organization by Category

A total of 11 organizations describe themselves as Muslim. From all the Contacts that where chosen, Mosques and Muslim umbrella organizations where the most frequent types from this background inside the contact list. Most Muslim organizations are from Germany (4) and Spain (4). In total 9 organizations describe themselves as confessional (Catholic, Protestant), 21 organizations were secular, 11 didn't answer the question, and 72 gave the answer non-Muslim.

Most answers that are presented in the following were given by a non-Muslim-organization (91%). An overview of the background of the participants and their organization can be found in the following graphic:

Muslim and Non-Muslim Organizations



4.1.3 Active in social Media

A majority is active on social media platforms (90 out of 113= 79,64%).

From those who are active on the social media platforms (total: 90) we wanted to know, what kind of platform they prefer to use.



Most (113) that are active on social media, use the platform Facebook (82), Instagram (45), YouTube (40), Twitter (32) and 18 are active inside all the mentioned platforms. Besides that, some were active on other smaller social Media platforms, but only single cases were reported.

The number of active participants can be useful if you compare it with the results of the online research on the platforms. So that the project can connect CSOs online inside a platform that is known and used by possible partner organizations.

Nevertheless, every country has to have an individual plan, while Germany and France in particular should be analysed. Regarding online radicalization, it is important that CSOs have experience on the platforms and a motivation for working on the platform as well, to maximize the effectiveness to tackle the phenomenon.

While Twitter was used quite often in French speaking language, in German not much could be found with similar search activities on the same platform. This shows that each country could have a different focus to work with.

4.2 Challenges for young People

From all the answers we received (exclude 16 from 113 = 97), around 68% of the participants said that job availability was one of the biggest challenges for young people.

The tables shows the differences of answers, between countries, participants and organizations in which they are operating. We exclude all the organizations that didn't answer the question, when calculating the percentages. But also want to show how many where not answering the question and include the number inside the table (N/A).

a) Question: What problems do young people have to face? Job possibility

Language the survey was answered (Area OPEN Partner is based)	Yes	No	N/A	Percentage, Participants see Job possibility as a struggle young people must face.
Spanish (Alicante)	24	6	5	80,0%
Italian (Rom)	26	3	6	89,66%
German (Berlin)	5	16	4	23,8%
French (Strasbourg/Nizza)	8	5	1	61,54%
English	3	1	0	75%
In Total	66	31	16	**68,04%**

In Italy and Spain, organizations are more worried on the job opportunities for young People, while in Germany this is not seen as a difficulty, what let the overall percentage for all countries fall drastically. If Germany (makes up for more than half of negative answers) was excluded, it can be said that inside Spain, Italy, and France (all English answered surveys can't be included; they could be from Germany as well), CSOs answered with a percentage of 80,55% that Job opportunity is an issue [Yes:58, No:14, NA:12].

b) Question: What problems do young people have to face? Low Income Jobs?

Language the survey was answered (Area OPEN Partner is based)	Yes	No	N/A	Percentage, Participants see Low Income Jobs as a struggle young people must face.
Spanish (Alicante)	22	8	5	73,33%
Italian (Rom)	17	12	6	58,62%
German (Berlin)	6	15	4	28,57%
French (Strasbourg/Nizza)	5	8	1	38,46%
English	2	2	0	50%
In Total	52	45	16	**53,61%**

Like the question of Job opportunities, Spain and Italy are countries were the question of low-income jobs was a problem among young people, while Germany and France are not agreeing to the statement.

c) Question: What problems do young people have to face? Spaces for social aggregation

Language the survey was answered (Area OPEN Partner is based)	Yes	No	N/A	Percentage, Participants see the need for Spaces for social aggregation as a struggle young people must face.
Spanish (Alicante)	5	25	5	16,67%
Italian (Rom)	16	13	6	55,17%
German (Berlin)	4	17	4	19,05%
French (Strasbourg/Nizza)	4	9	1	30,77%
English	1	3	0	25%
In Total	30	67	16	**30,93%**

In the eyes of the participants there is no need for more spaces for social aggregation. In Italy 16 Participants were seeing need for more facilities. But with 13 are opposing this answer, it can be sad that it is not changing the overall picture that there is not a need in this regard in the partners' areas.

d) What problems do young people have to face? [Rents of apartment at too high costs]

Language the survey was answered (Area OPEN Partner is based)	Yes	No	N/A	Percentage, Participants see High apartment rents as a struggle young people must face.
Spanish (Alicante)	17	13	5	56,67%
Italian (Rom)	16	13	6	55,17%
German (Berlin)	8	13	4	38,09%
French (Strasbourg/Nizza)	10	3	1	76,92%
English	2	2	0	50%
In Total	53	44	16	**54,64%**

The living expenses for young people were seen as a problem. In Germany, the participants reported an opposite experience than all other.

e) What problems do young people have to face? [social exclusion (the act of making certain groups of people within a society fell isolated and unimportant)]

Language the survey was answered (Area OPEN Partner is based)	Yes	No	N/A	Percentage, Participants see a social exclusion as a struggle young people must face.
Spanish (Alicante)	12	18	5	40%
Italian (Rom)	21	8	6	72,41%
German (Berlin)	6	15	4	28,57%
French (Strasbourg/Nizza)	5	8	1	38,46%
English	2	2	0	50%
In Total	46	51	16	**47,42%**

The CSOs do not see a need for projects that tackle the phenomenon of social exclusion. An exception can be found in Italy were 72,41% of CSOs answered that social exclusion is a social issue.

f) What problems do young people have to face? [Drug abuse (alcohol is seen as drug as well)]

Language the survey was answered (Area OPEN Partner is based)	Yes	No	N/A	Percentage, Participants see Drug abuse as a struggle young people must face.
Spanish (Alicante)	10	20	5	33,33%
Italian (Rom)	10	19	6	34,48%
German (Berlin)	7	14	4	33,33%
French (Strasbourg/Nizza)	5	8	1	38,46%
English	2	2	0	50%
In Total	34	63	16	**35,05%**

Negative: Drug Abuse among the youth is not seen as a problem by most of the asked Participants.

g) What problems do young people have to face? [Religious radicalization]

Language the survey was answered (Area OPEN Partner is based)	Yes	No	N/A	Percentage, Participants see a religious radicalization as a struggle young people must face.
Spanish (Alicante)	1	29	5	3,33%
Italian (Rom)	1	28	6	3,45%
German (Berlin)	11	10	4	52,38%
French (Strasbourg/Nizza)	6	7	1	46,15%
English	1	3	0	25%
In Total	20	77	16	**20,62%**

In Germany and France, around 50% of the participants responded to the problem of religious radicalization. In Spain and Italy, most of the responses were indicating no religious radicalization at all.

h) How would your organization describe the socio-economic situation of young Muslims?



The data shows that the participants are seeing a difference between young Muslims and non-Muslims regarding their socio-economic situation.



4.3 Radicalization of young Muslims

a) Do you see a problem of Muslim youth radicalization in your city?

From the 23 Participants that answered with Yes: 13 Germany, 2 Spain, 5 France, 3 Italy.

b) What kind of causes do you see for the radicalization of young Muslims? [Social exclusion]

Language the survey was answered (Area OPEN Partner is based)	Yes	No	N/A	Percentage, Participants see Social exclusion as a cause for the radicalization of young Muslims
Spanish (Alicante)	15	15	5	50,00%
Italian (Rom)	24	5	6	82,75%
German (Berlin)	7	14	4	33,33%
French (Strasbourg/Nizza)	7	6	1	53,85%
English	2	2	0	50%

In Total	55	42	16	**56,7%**

In Germany 2 out of 3 asked professionals, do not think that social exclusion is a reason for the possible radicalization of young people. In all the other countries, it is nearly equal answers between yes and no. A exception can be seen in Italy were most of the professionals that were asked, agree that social exclusion is the reason for a radicalization of young Muslims (82,75%).

c) What kind of causes do you see for the radicalization of young Muslims? [Islam mainly through Social Media "education"]

Language the survey was answered (Area OPEN Partner is based)	Yes	No	N/A	Percentage, Participants see Islam through Social Media "education" as a cause for the radicalization of young Muslims
Spanish (Alicante)	10	20	5	33,33%
Italian (Rom)	4	25	6	13,79%
German (Berlin)	11	10	4	52,38%
French (Strasbourg/Nizza)	5	8	1	38,46%
English	1	3	0	25,00%
In Total	31	66	16	**31,96%**

Most of the participance do not see a connection with a picture of Islam that is created though social Media education. In Italy only 13,79% agree to the statement, while in Germany a maximum of 52,38% agreed to the standpoint. In total 31,96% agreement stands, for no support for the hypothesis inside the partner countries.

d) What kind of causes do you see for the radicalization of young Muslims? [Follow of "hyper morality"]

Language the survey was answered (Area OPEN Partner is based)	Yes	No	N/A	Percentage, Participants see "hyper morality" as a cause for the radicalization of young Muslims
Spanish (Alicante)	6	24	5	20,00%
Italian (Rom)	3	26	6	10,35%
German (Berlin)	10	11	4	47,62%
French (Strasbourg/Nizza)	2	11	1	15,39%

English	0	4	0	0%
In Total	21	76	16	**27,63%**

Hyper morality was not seen as a cause for a radicalization of young people.

e) What kind of causes do you see for the radicalization of young Muslims? [Belief that Islam is only politics]

Language the survey was answered (Area OPEN Partner is based)	Yes	No	N/A	Percentage, Participants see Islam as only politics as a cause for the radicalization of young Muslims
Spanish (Alicante)	4	26	5	13,33%
Italian (Rom)	2	27	6	6,90%
German (Berlin)	9	12	4	42,86%
French (Strasbourg/Nizza)	3	10	1	23,08%
English	0	4	0	0%
In Total	18	79	16	**18,56%**

The majority is negating the answer possibility. Only 18,56% of the answers indicate that a strong political viewpoint of Islam can lead to a radicalization of young Muslims.

f) What kind of causes do you see for the radicalization of young Muslims? [A lack of knowledge of Islam]

Language the survey was answered (Area OPEN Partner is based)	Yes	No	N/A	Percentage, Participants see A lack of knowledge of Islam as a cause for the radicalization of young Muslims
Spanish (Alicante)	11	19	5	36,67%
Italian (Rom)	20	9	6	68,97%
German (Berlin)	8	13	4	38,10%
French (Strasbourg/Nizza)	6	7	1	46,15%
English	1	3	0	25,00%
In Total	46	51	16	**47,42%**

Most of the organizations and social workers do not agree with the statement, that radicalization is connected to a lack of religious knowledge. An exception can be seen in the answers in Italy, 68,97% agreed to the statement.

g) What kind of causes do you see for the radicalization of young Muslims? [No connection to Islamic Community]

Language the survey was answered (Area OPEN Partner is based)	Yes	No	N/A	Percentage, Participants see No connection to Islamic Community as a cause for the radicalization of young Muslims
Spanish (Alicante)	3	27	5	10,00%
Italian (Rom)	5	24	6	17,24%
German (Berlin)	4	17	4	19,05%
French (Strasbourg/Nizza)	2	11	1	15,39%
English	1	3	0	25,00%
In Total	15	82	16	**15,46%**

Most of the participant can't see a connection between a radicalization and a distance to the Islamic community.

There was also the opportunity to give a self-chosen answer to the phenomenon. Below are some examples that were expressed.

One organization was mentioning a lack of international relations and political education for young people. Another one argued that there was not enough neutral media presence, that could help in a neutral understanding of the phenomenon. Economic circumstances were named. An interesting statement came from an Italian organization that claimed that the subject of radicalization can be visible and powerful, something the radicalized person could not experience in his "normal" life.

h) Have you ever had experience with radical young Muslims in the past?

Language the survey was answered (Area OPEN Partner is based)	Yes	No	N/A	Percentage, CSOs see Job possibility as a struggle young people must face.
Spanish (Alicante)	3	24	8	11,11%
Italian (Rom)	5	22	8	18,52%
German (Berlin)	14	4	7	77,78%

French (Strasbourg/Nizza)	8	5	1	61,53%
English	1	2	1	25,00%
In Total	31	57	25	**35,23%**

Most of the CSOs never had experience with radical Muslims before. In France and in Germany, the opposite is the case. That fits to our online research.

4.4 Radicalization on social Media

Do you have specific experience about the radicalization of young Muslims through social media?

Language the survey was answered (Area OPEN Partner is based)	Yes	No	N/A	Percentage, Participants experienced the radicalization of young Muslims through social Media
Spanish (Alicante)	5	20	10	20,00%
Italian (Rom)	6	22	7	21,43%
German (Berlin)	12	7	6	63,16%
French (Strasbourg/Nizza)	6	6	2	50,00%
English	0	3	1	0%
In Total	29	58	26	**33,33%**

Only the 29 participants that answered with “yes” are presented in the following. For the next Question we wanted to now on which platform it took place.

Language the survey was answered (Area OPEN Partner is based)	YouTube	Facebook	Twitter	Instagram	Telegram
Spanish (Alicante)	1	2	2	2	1
Italian (Rom)	3	3	0	1	1
German (Berlin)	9	9	5	6	3
French (Strasbourg/Nizza)	3	5	3	2	4
In Total	16	19	10	**11**	**9**

4.4 Statements regarding a possible campaign

In the following, some statements on deradicalization strategies, that were found in the literature review are presented. All the answers above 20 are highlighted in yellow.

Statement 1

How do you agree with the following sentences: [Real education of Muslims usually needs to be connected to a proper understanding of Islam, Iman and Ihsan, based on one of the accepted Islamic Schools of Law (Maliki, Hanifi etc). All the schools exclude any form of radicalism or violence. This kind of education is the main topic to be strengthened to counter radicalization.]

Answer Possibility	Result No. of Participance
Very	26
Quite	31
Little	8
Not at all	8
I do not know	15

Statement 2

How do you agree with the following statements: [The social situation of young Muslims is of high relevance (job, identity, rights) and has to be improved in order to counter radicalization Often simple frustration is the base for possible radicalization.]
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Answer Possibility	Result No. of Participance
Very	25
Quite	32
Little	14
Not at all	11
I do not know	6

Statement 3

How do you agree with the following statements: [Young Muslims with an immigrant background feel often not accepted as Europeans. Young Muslims must be introduced to the possibility of a Muslim and European identity to counter radicalization].

Answer Possibility	Result No. of Participance
Very	34
Quite	21
Little	12
Not at all	12
I do not know	5

4.6 Offers for possible deradicalization strategy

a) Are you aware of offers for young Muslims in your area for political or cultural education?

Language the survey was answered (Area OPEN Partner is based)	Yes	No	N/A	Percentage, Participants are aware of offers for young Muslims regarding political or cultural education
Spanish (Alicante)	2	17	16	10,53%
Italian (Rom)	7	20	8	25,93%
German (Berlin)	3	6	16	33,33%
French (Strasbourg/Nizza)	2	3	9	40,00%
English	0	2	2	0%
In Total	14	48	51	**22,58%**

b) Are there any offers for interexchange between young people with different faith background?

Language the survey was answered (Area OPEN Partner is based)	Yes	No	N/A	Percentage, Participants are aware of offers for interexchange between young people with different faith background
Spanish (Alicante)	6	13	16	31,58%
Italian (Rom)	12	15	8	44,44%
German (Berlin)	4	5	16	44,44%
French (Strasbourg/Nizza)	2	3	9	40,00%

English	0	2	2	0%
In Total	24	38	51	**38,71%**

5 Action to counter Radicalization

After evaluating the desk and field analysis, we especially suggest the following priorities for the further course of the OPEN campaign.

A)

When dealing with Muslim adolescents (see also analysis of online-ethnography), the following steps are recommended for Muslim NGOs and YOUTH organizations:

- Muslim life and lived democracy are not a contradiction. The freedom to practice religion is a fundamental European right. Muslim and democratic beliefs are not mutually exclusive.
- European Muslims are an accepted part of the global community. Cultural and spiritual influences (i.e. Goethe) in Europe also enliven the spiritual, worldwide life of Muslims.
- The European experience with ideologies (dictatorships) explains the rejection of Muslim ideological approaches. Historical education is therefore an important element in the training of Muslims in Europe.
- The political engagement of Muslims within the framework of European laws and their use in civil society is welcome. The accusation of "legalistic" Islam requires careful examination and differentiation.
- There are undoubtedly Muslim extremists, but there is no Islamic extremism. A good education in Islam always makes the difference clear.
- Muslim media and Muslim journalists (offline / online) are important partners for the dissemination of constructive and positive approaches by Muslims.
- Radical *Salafism's* claim for truth does not coincide with the absolute majority of Muslim scholars. It also does not correspond to the centuries-old tradition (inner-Islamic tolerance) of the Muslims.
- Equality between men and women is not only a European value, it is also emphasized in Islam. The commitment of young Muslim women is therefore to be welcomed.
- Islamic law allows us to react to changing social conditions.
- European foreign policy and its moral objectives need to be better explained to young people. The arguments of "hyper moral" must be put into perspective.

B)

The following aspects arise for non-Muslim NGOs (see also desk analysis):

- Religion is only one factor in the radicalization of young Muslims. The economic, social, and political situation of young Muslims must be given greater attention.
- Muslims willing to use violence are a relatively small minority even in problematic Muslim groups. Good Islamic education protects against radicalization.
- Muslim organizations and their mosque communities are already making an important contribution to preventing radicalization.
- Young Muslims expect a higher level of social recognition than European citizens with equal rights, but often suffer from experiences of discrimination.
- Success stories of European Muslims must be better perceived by the public and underline the positive contribution that Muslims make in Europe today.
- The youth exchange between Muslims and other young people of all denominations in Europe is extremely important.

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